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INTRODUCTION 
The repatriation and return1 of objects of cultural value are often 
linked to decolonization projects and efforts to repair past wrongs 
suffered as a result of colonialism.2 Yet, significant barriers hinder 
these efforts. These barriers primarily take the shape of time 
limitations; diverging conceptions of property and ownership; the 
high costs involved; and the domestic export and cultural heritage 
laws (of both the source country and the destination country). This 
Article argues that these barriers are relics of colonialism that 
replicate and perpetuate the continued imposition of Eurocentric and 
                                                                                                                                     
1 The term "repatriation" is used to refer to the restoration of cultural objects 
within a state, such as from Canada to its domestic indigenous groups or 
communities. The term "return,” however, is used to describe the restoration of 
cultural objects that were removed from the territorial borders of a state, usually 
during colonial occupation, or illegally exported from a state. See, e.g., CRAIG 
FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 
142–45 (Routledge 2010). 
2 See, e.g., DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, G.A. Res. 
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/142 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP], 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf; Catherine Bell, 
Repatriation of Cultural Material to First Nations in Canada: Legal and Ethical 
Justifications in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, 
COLONIZATION, AND COMMERCE 81, 87 (James A. R. Nafziger & Ann M. 
Nicgorski eds., Brill Academic Publishers, Inc. 2009) [hereinafter Bell, 
Justifications]. 
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Western3 legal notions, as well as, values on subaltern source 
countries and source indigenous groups.4 In order to truly move 
beyond the remaining relics of colonialism into a context where the 
culture and values of all groups are accorded equal respect, it is 
important that these barriers be removed. 
A critical postcolonial lens will be used to explore these barriers 
within international and domestic (primarily Canadian) legal 
frameworks.5 This Article considers potential methods and 
mechanisms for overcoming these barriers/colonial relics and asks 
whether these potential solutions are themselves only an extension 
of colonialism. This can be seen since these solutions engage with 
and replicate Eurocentric and Western legal notions and values 
                                                                                                                                     
3 The author uses both terms to account for the different challenges, views, 
approaches, and legal frameworks existing in Europe and the "West," 
respectively. The two can be mutually exclusive. See, e.g., JOHN M. HOBSON, 
THE EUROCENTRIC CONCEPTION OF WORLD POLITICS: WESTERN 
INTERNATIONAL THEORY, 1760-2010 at 234 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
4 For the present purpose, the author will view both indigenous groups and 
source countries as subaltern in comparison to the loci where repatriation and 
return is sought and where mechanisms for repatriation and return are developed 
and subsequently imposed upon the subaltern. The particular scope of my 
discussion of sources groups and countries versus destinations, leads to a binary 
where non-Western/non-Eurocentric state legal systems as well as non-
Western/non-Eurocentric non-state centered legal orders are often 
simultaneously marginalized in comparison to Western/Eurocentric frameworks. 
As such, my discussion of the subalternity prevalent within many traditional 
source groups and source states of cultural objects is limited. See generally 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak, in MARXISM AND THE 
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg, eds., 
Macmillan, 1988); JOANNE SHARP, GEOGRAPHIES OF POSTCOLONIALISM: 
SPACES OF POWER AND REPRESENTATION ch. 6 (SAGE 2009) (discussing the 
subaltern). See, e.g., Val Napoleon, Thinking About Indigenous Legal Orders, in 
DIALOGUES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL PLURALISM 229, 243–44 (René 
Provost & Colleen Sheppard, eds., Springer, 2013) (referencing the Canadian 
Aboriginal context and internal oppression and power imbalances). The author 
also draws on the permutation of subaltern studies seen in the work of 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos and subaltern cosmopolitanism. See, e.g., TOWARD 
A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2d ed. 2002). 
5 Due to the author’s focus on the international context as well as the Canadian 
domestic context, the author will largely avoid undertaking an in-depth analysis 
of the situation in the United States since the existence of the North American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) imports many nuances that 
are distinct from Canada and beyond the scope of the present project. But see the 
Native American Graves and Repatriation Act, Pub L No 101-601 (1990) 
(codified as 25 U.S.C. § 3001) [hereinafter NAGPRA]. 
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rather than stepping outside of the hegemonic structure in order to 
incorporate alternative legal and cultural norms, notions, and values.  
This Article draws on a transsystemic methodology6 in order to 
seek out alternative solutions, underlie commonalities, and strip 
away the colonial gaze.7 This Article refers to Peter H. Welsh’s 
notion of the potent object,8 in order to remove Eurocentric and 
Western-based definitions of what constitutes a cultural object for 
which repatriation or return may be claimed.9 The Article turns to 
Roman law, Quebec civil law, and legislative interpretation in 
Quebec case law in order to excavate a legal-pluralistic application 
of res extra commercium, and specifically, res divini juris and res 
sacrae, to the repatriation and return of potent cultural objects to 
source states and indigenous groups that demand their return.10  
Finally, this Article suggests that through greater international 
recognition and a more complete application of the res extra 
commercium status of potent cultural objects, pervasive Western 
and Eurocentric commodification of these objects can be removed. 
By removing this commodification, hegemonic barriers enforced by 
Western and Eurocentric notions of value, ownership, and legal 
frameworks, in order to approach claims for return and repatriation 
in a non-colonial fashion, can be achieved.11  
                                                                                                                                     
6 A transsystemic approach excavates existing legal frameworks in order to look 
at what is underneath—it seeks a step beyond legal pluralism. See infra Part I.A; 
see infra notes 16–18. 
7 See EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (Vintage Books 1979); FRANTZ FANON, 
BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann, trans., Grove Press 
1991). 
8 Welsh, infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
9 An example of this would be the pervasive reference to the “sacred” which is a 
simplistic view of objects of extreme cultural importance to claimant groups.  
10 For Roman terminology, see Sohm, infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
11 In discussing legal orders, systems, and frameworks, the author uses the term 
“legal framework” in the spirit of the transsystemic methodology the author 
seeks to apply. Infra notes 16–18. The author’s intention is to utilize a neutral 
term that refers to both state-centered legal systems as well as non-state centered 
legal orders. Certain scholars, such as Val Napoleon have distinguished between 
legal systems and legal orders so as to avoid the imposition of Western and 
Eurocentric legal notions onto non-Western, non-Eurocentric, and specifically, 
indigenous societies. The author notes the merits of this approach but wishes to 
circumvent both terms in order to avoid a separation that may enable their 
respective placement in a hierarchy of valuation where one category may be 
allotted more importance or legitimacy than the other. The author will instead 
simply preface “framework” with “non-Western/non-Eurocentric” and 
“Western/Eurocentric.” 
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This work proceeds in eleven parts. Part I provides an 
introduction to the theory and methodology utilized in the foregoing 
analysis and briefly situates the discussion within the related 
academic dialogue. Part II undertakes an orienting discussion of the 
topic to introduce the notion of the potent cultural object and the 
actors involved in claims for the repatriation and return of these 
objects. Part III turns to the reasons that motivate claims for the 
repatriation and return of potent cultural objects and also briefly 
explains the reasons behind counter opinions that reject the 
legitimacy of these claims. Part IV then assesses the current legal 
frameworks—both international as well as domestic—that are 
available and must be utilized in formulating a claim for the 
repatriation or return of potent cultural objects. This part 
additionally touches on the non-legal (or soft law) mechanisms 
available for these purposes. Part V distills the ever-present colonial 
element embodied by the barriers—both internationally and 
domestically—to claims for repatriation and return within current 
frameworks available for repatriation and return. This part examines 
the barriers in order to explain why and how they maintain colonial 
domination over groups and individuals formulating claims for 
repatriation and return. Part VI then turns to current legal and 
extralegal strategies that are available and may be used in order to 
circumvent the barriers to claims for repatriation and return. This 
part, however, concludes that these strategies ultimately maintain 
and even further entrench the colonial element rather than removing 
it. Part VII therefore suggests an alternative. This part proposes the 
removal of commodification from objects. Commodification is 
discussed and a transsystemic approach is introduced as means by 
which commodification may be removed through the application of 
res extra commercium. Part VIII discusses the limited appearance of 
res extra commercium within existing Eurocentric and Western 
legal frameworks—both in the context of civil law jurisdictions and 
common law jurisdictions. This is done in order to recognize that a 
notion such as res extra commercium, which describes the 
invaluable nature that potent cultural objects carry for claimant 
groups and individuals, can also be recognized within dominant 
legal frameworks that currently only germinate barriers to claims for 
repatriation and return. Part IX presents a case study of a situation 
where a dominant legal framework—as applied by the Quebec 
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Superior Court and Quebec Court of Appeal—permitted the return 
of potent cultural objects to the claimant party, the Roman Catholic 
Church. Part X uses the case study of l’Ange-Gardien in Quebec, 
Canada to demonstrate a real-world scenario of how, through a legal 
pluralistic application of the laws of the Roman Catholic Church 
(that define that which constitutes a potent cultural object within its 
governing framework), the market value of the element was simply 
nullified and returned to the claimant party even where the 
possessing parties suffered a monetary loss. This Article concludes 
by acknowledging some of the realities pertaining to application and 
enforcement and, finally, concludes with a word of caution, which 
is included as a pre-emptory note here. What follows is a radical 
departure from existing options for claims for repatriation and return 
by subaltern groups and countries. It stems from a critical analysis 
meant to explore a mechanism to thoroughly challenge current 
perceptions and insist on the serious barriers that continue to 
populate the status quo within existing options for claims for 
repatriation and return. 
It is important to note that the intention of this Article is not to 
impose Roman law concepts or other Eurocentric or Western legal 
notions upon source nations or indigenous groups. Instead, it 
articulates a view of how dominant legal infrastructures can and 
should deal with situations where domestic indigenous groups or 
source nations/groups request the return of potent cultural objects. 
It is about how the Western or Eurocentric legal infrastructures deal 
with their part in these scenarios, not about how foreign groups must 
acquiesce to the laws of nations or peoples in possession of removed 
objects. 
 
I. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
In applying post-colonial theory, the Article draws on the notion 
of the colonizer’s gaze.12 The barriers to the repatriation and return 
of cultural objects are colonial relics as they force the “colonized,” 
                                                                                                                                     
12 SAID, supra note 7. While Said may have fallen out of favor with some 
modern postcolonial theorists (see, e.g., MARK GIBSON, CULTURE AND POWER: 
A HISTORY OF CULTURAL STUDIES 190 (Berg 2007)) and that his notion of 
orientalism is characterized by a binary structure that does not take into account 
subaltern groups within the "colonized,” the colonizer's gaze is useful in 
illustrating the barriers to the repatriation and return of cultural objects. See also, 
FANON, supra note 7. 
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non-Western, and non-Eurocentric into the “colonizer’s” Western 
and Eurocentric notions of cultural value and legal frameworks of 
ownership and property. This in turn forces the colonized to voice 
their claims for repatriation and return within the parameters set out 
by the colonizer in order to regain their cultural objects. In this vein, 
the Article also employs Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural 
hegemony. As Douglas Litowitz wrote:  
 
In a hegemonic regime, an unjust social arrangement 
is internalized and endlessly reinforced in schools, 
churches, institutions, scholarly exchanges, 
museums, and popular culture. Gramsci’s work on 
hegemony provides a useful starting point for legal 
scholars who understand that domination is often 
subtle, invisible, and consensual.13  
 
A Gramscian assessment is an appropriate starting point when 
questioning the status quo where the current dominance of Western 
and Eurocentric frameworks and perceptions must be faced in 
claims for repatriation and return. It additionally furnishes the 
critical component in the application of post-colonial theory that 
enables a deconstruction of hegemonic structures and the means by 
which to step outside of them, in order to investigate alternative 
frameworks.14 Reference to cultural hegemony also accounts for 
Western and Eurocentric predispositions to reify the Universalist 
value of cultural objects and “museumification” of the colonized 
subaltern that remains.15 
In using a transsystemic methodology,16 the Article seeks to look 
“underneath” current legal frameworks in order to consider “law 
which is more deeply rooted or profound than the law of legal 
                                                                                                                                     
13 Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515, 
519 (2000). 
14Id. at 515–16. 
15 See, e.g., David Fleming, Positioning the Museum for Social Inclusion, in 
MUSEUMS, SOCIETY, INEQUALITY 213, 215–16 (Richard Sandell, ed., Routledge 
2002); John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 
CALIF. L. REV. 339 (1989) [hereinafter Merryman, Public Interest]. 
16 For a general discussion of transsystemia, see Peter L. Strauss, 
Transsystemia—Are We Approaching a New Langdellian Moment?—Is McGill 
Leading the Way?, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 763 (2006). 
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systems, that which pervades all of them”17 and to move beyond a 
comparative approach.18  
While a legal pluralist approach incorporating the laws of source 
indigenous groups or countries may provide some resolution in 
addressing claims for repatriation and return, its focus on: 1) the 
“legal;” 2) the conceptualization of “law;” and 3) the ambiguities of 
the terms “legal” and “pluralism,” can limit the ability to inclusively 
address the often nuanced claims of source indigenous groups and 
states for the repatriation and return of potent cultural objects.19 
Legal pluralism may intensify disputes while exacerbating 
uncertainty. As Brian Tamanaha explained: 
 
Legal disputes usually center on which party has the 
better case under the law; disputes in contexts of 
legal pluralism present an additional layer of 
questions about which law controls when two or 
more contrasting legal regimes point toward 
different outcomes. This puts at issue the respective 
authority and power of the competing legal systems 
themselves.20 
 
Vulnerability subsequent to a successful claim may also arise in the 
context of a challenge based within the competing legal 
framework.21  
A transsystemic approach would ideally seek to 
“deconflictualize” claims for repatriation and return by lessening the 
                                                                                                                                     
17 H. Patrick Glenn, Doin' the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal 
Traditions, 50 MCGILL L.J. 863, 867 (2005) [hereinafter Glenn, Transsystemic]. 
18 See Richard Janda, Toward Cosmopolitan Law, 50 MCGILL L.J. 967, 
981(2005). For a discussion of transsystemic law as a method of deconstruction 
and of engaging with the work of Jacques Derrida, see generally id. and 
especially id. at 976. 
19 See William Twining, Legal Pluralism 101, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND 
DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 112, 115, 122–23 
(Brian Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2012) [hereinafter Twining, Legal Pluralism]. 
20 Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development, in 
LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN 
DIALOGUE 34, 47 (Brian Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds., 
Cambridge U. Press 2012). 
21 Id. 
306 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:297 
 
focus on “underlying conflict and the constant need for win/lose 
decisions.”22 Moreover, the approach would seek out meta-
notions—or meta-rules—by examining “legal concepts or 
instruments that facilitate the relations between different legal 
orders or traditions”23 to establish what has been referred to as a 
“sustainable diversity in law.” Thus, the approach focuses on the 
accommodation of “diverse legal unities” while attempting to 
sidestep the potential pitfalls and clashes involved in the binary 
exercise of accommodating difference.24  
A transsystemic approach would also seek to reach beyond the 
legal pluralist approach to control the complex realities faced by 
claimants. For example, claimants may face a lack of any 
identifiable legal or normative expression of an object’s potency 
within the legal systems, networks, or orders with which they 
identify. This can remove their ability to justify the repatriation or 
return of the object when facing the possessing entity’s identified 
legal framework if that framework presents conflicting property and 
ownership laws that shield the possessor. Where a legal pluralist 
approach may not account for “internal variations within what may 
be claimed to be a single law,” a transsystemic approach would seek 
to address the lack of homogeneity within groups or categories of 
the population. This approach can better treat the claims of subaltern 
groups that remain unacknowledged or have no standing within the 
larger cultural group with which they identify or with which the 
cultural object is identified.25 A transsystemic approach 
deemphasizes the clash and divergences between different legal 
frameworks and excavates the underlying commonalities that may 
                                                                                                                                     
22 H. Patrick Glenn, Sustainable Diversity in Law, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND 
DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 95, 105 (Brian 
Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds.,Cambridge U. Press 2012) 
[hereinafter Glenn, Sustainable Diversity]. 
23 Id. at 102. 
24 See, e.g., id. at 104–07. See generally H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS 
OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (Oxford U. Press, 5th ed., 
2014). 
25 Gordon R. Woodman, The Development “Problem” of Legal Pluralism: An 
Analysis and Steps toward Solutions, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: 
SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 129, 141 (Brian Tamanaha, 
Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
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reveal possibilities for collaboration amongst these frameworks.26 
The intention of this archaeology of legal frameworks is to: 1) focus 
on the underlying fluidity beneath different legal and non-legal 
orders rather than a potentially disjunctive or combative 
combination; 2) remove the categorization and separation of 
different legal frameworks that enables the potentiality of 
hierarchical ordering and valuation of certain frameworks over 
others with a view to disempowering the powerful and neutralizing 
the dominant;27 and 3) avoid a further entrenching of hegemonic 
injustice and domination, with the goal of greater respect for 
traditionally marginalized non-Western and non-Eurocentric legal 
frameworks. 
As Sally Engle Merry suggests, “Understanding law in 
contemporary post-colonial societies requires an archaeology of 
law: a historical unpacking of this complexity.”28 Looking “under” 
the law, and past the borders of particular jurisdictions or legal 
traditions leads to the discussion of a concept that appears in Roman 
law: res extra commercium. Res extra commercium removes an 
object from the possibility of sale, renders it unmerchantable, 
inalienable, and outside of the reaches of the market due to the 
object’s potent characteristics.29  
This Article considers Roman law (res divini juris and res extra 
commercium) and the appearance of similar notions in modern 
civilian legal frameworks and international law, especially in the 
Province of Quebec, Canada. While recognizing that a legal pluralist 
approach is no cure-all and may suffer from the faults referred to 
above,30 it nonetheless provides an important element in the 
                                                                                                                                     
26 For an excellent discussion pertaining to the connectors across legal traditions, 
notably within Canada, see JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS 
CONSTITUTION 118–24 (Univ. of Toronto Press 2010). 
27 For a discussion of the hierarchies of legal systems in Canada, see id. at 12–
22. 
28 Sally Engle Marry, Legal Pluralism and Legal Culture: Mapping the Terrain, 
in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN 
DIALOGUE 66, 68 (Brian Tamanaha, Caroline Sage & Michael Woolcock, eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
29 See, e.g., CULTURAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, AND INDIGENOUS 
536–37 (James A. R. Nafziger, Robert Kirkwood Paterson & Alison Dundes 
Renteln, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010). 
30 See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ often-quoted statement referring to 
some of the inadequacies of the notion of legal pluralism: “To my mind there is 
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application of a transsystemic methodology. As such, legal 
pluralism is referred to make sense of the method used in Quebec 
civil law to apply res extra commercium to the repatriation of 
cultural objects claimed as sacred under canon law.  
Quebec is an example to draw on as it presents a jurisdiction 
already ripe with legal pluralism due to the interaction of the 
province’s civil law framework, based on the Civil Code of Quebec, 
and Canada’s federal common law framework—especially where 
the remainder of Canadian provincial (or territorial) legal 
frameworks are structured according to common law principles. 
Additionally, with reference to the case of l’Ange-Gardien, there is 
an example of the acknowledgment of an underlying unifying 
notion—res extra commercium—between Quebec civil law and 
cannon law.31 This “meta-notion” is uncovered in the very particular 
context of a state’s legal treatment of the claims for the return of 
potent cultural objects by an institution (the Catholic Church) that 
has been strongly associated with past colonization and is not 
traditionally linked to subalternity or marginalization. Quebec also 
provides an interesting example of the documented coexistence of 
both state law pluralism as well as what Gordon Woodman describes 
                                                                                                                                     
nothing inherently good, progressive, or emancipatory about ‘legal pluralism.’” 
(TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND 
EMANCIPATION 114 (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2d ed., 2002). Instead, Santos 
“prefer[s] to speak of a plurality of legal orders.” Id. Santos introduces the 
notion of “interlegalities,” which more effectively addresses “the conception of 
different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds, as 
much as our actions.” Id. at 472–73 (emphasis added). As opposed to the more 
traditional notion of legal pluralism that focuses the coexistence of separate 
legal systems, networks or orders in the same geographical space and period of 
time. See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 83 
(Northwestern Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter TWINING, GLOBALISATION]. 
However, for the present scope the author will refer generally to legal pluralism 
as the interaction and incorporation of a plurality of legal orders that coexist in 
the same time and space, and interact and are (ideally) accepted and 
acknowledged by the dominant framework within which claims for repatriation 
and return must often be filtered. In addition, Brian Tamanaha provides helpful 
guidance for a progressive discussion and application of the notion of legal 
pluralism today with a list of six groupings of “systems of normative ordering in 
social arenas. Brian Z Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to 
Present, Local to Global (2008) 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 [hereinafter Tamanaha, 
Understanding]. See also Woodman, supra note 25 at 133–38. 
31 L'Ange-Gardien (Paroisse) c. Québec (Procureur Général) (1987), 8 Q.A.C. 1 
(Can.). 
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as “deep legal pluralism” (in which state law coexists with non-state 
laws).32  
While reference to Roman law may seem paradoxical to a post-
colonial approach, due to its grounding importance to many colonial 
legal orders, it may be investigated transsystemically in order to 
seek out “meta-notions” that are understandable across legal 
traditions, such as res extra commercium. These can then enable a 
node of agreement, or a bridge, between traditions in order to 
achieve a sustainable diversity in law that may provide recourse to 
claimants where a clash between legal frameworks and values 
cannot be effectively negotiated—notably where claimants are in 
highly subaltern situations.33 “Meta-notions” that are 
understandable, acceptable, or recognized by both dominant 
segments of society and marginalized segments of society, but 
which are also favorable to the interests of marginalized groups, 
may ultimately be more easily implemented. But where no node of 
agreement can be established, legal pluralism remains a helpful 
default approach. 
It is additionally worth noting that legal pluralism itself may face 
a similar critique of its paradoxical application in the post-colonial 
context where “[t]o a large extent the roots of contemporary legal 
pluralities of global law are buried in the colonial era.”34 But, legal 
pluralism remains valuable as a tool when approached as a fluid 
concept addressing both the factual reality of plural legal orders (or, 
the “social fact” of legal pluralism)35 and the theoretical tools it may 
provide, rather than defining legal pluralism according to the by-
products of its prior instances.  
Turning to the cultural objects in question, Welsh’s term “potent 
object” is used for a non-secular and neutral understanding of 
cultural objects that moves beyond Western and Eurocentric 
imposition of limiting terms such as “sacred.” The “potent object” 
                                                                                                                                     
32 Woodman, supra note 25, at 132. 
33 Glenn, Sustainable Diversity, supra note 22 at 104–05. Cf. BOAVENTURA DE 
SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE (Butterworths 
LexisNexis, 2d ed., 2002) (notion of a non-hegemonic use of hegemonic legal 
tools). 
34 Merry, supra note 28, at 67. See also TWINING, GLOBALISATION, supra note 
30, at 224. 
35 See, e.g., Twining, Legal Pluralism, supra note 19, at 120–22. 
310 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:297 
 
also enables a better representation of a cultural object’s importance 
within political, moral, economic, and religious domains.36 
Finally, commodification of culture and cultural objects is 
referred to, as well as, the alternative conception of “ownership as 
belonging” rather than “ownership as property”37 This allows for the 
argument that the res extra commercium status of potent objects, 
combined with a legal-pluralistic approach, deferring to the claimant 
group’s demonstration of an object’s potency to their culture 
established according to their internal norms and frameworks, will 
lead to the decommodification of potent cultural objects and 
removal from the market.38 This will, in turn, enable a neutralization 
of the hegemony of Western and Eurocentric conceptions of the 
market value of cultural objects that ultimately creates an 
overarching barrier within the legal frameworks for repatriation and 
return.  
 
A. Engaging with the Literature Gap 
There is a dearth of material dealing with the repatriation and 
return of cultural objects on four fronts. First, there is a lack of 
                                                                                                                                     
36 Peter H. Welsh, Repatriation and Cultural Preservation: Potent Objects, 
Potent Past, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 837, 857–58 (1992). 
37 On the commodification of culture, see generally, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: 
COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (Arjun Appadurai, ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1986); RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN 
LAW AND CULTURE 137 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, eds., New 
York Univ. Press 2005). See also Rosemary J. Coombe & Joseph F. Turcotte, 
Indigenous Cultural Heritage in Development and Trade: Perspectives from the 
Dynamics of Cultural Heritage Law and Policy, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN 
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 221 (Christopher 
Beat Graber, Karolina Kuprecht & Jessica Christine Lai, eds., Edward Elgar 
2012); Rosemary J. Coombe, Legal Claims to Culture in and Against the 
Market: Neoliberalism and the Global Proliferation of Meaningful Difference, 
1L. CULTURE AND THE HUMANITIES 32 (2005) [hereinafter Coombe, Legal 
Claims]. See also Francesca Fiorentini, The Trade of Cultural Property: Legal 
Pluralism in an Age of Global Institutions, in LA CONVENCIÓN DE LA UNESCO 
DE 1970 SUS NUEVOS DESAFIOS (Jorge A. Sánchez Cordero, ed., Univ. 
Autónoma de México 2013). On “ownership as belonging” versus “ownership 
as property,” see Brian Noble, Owning as Belonging/Owning as Property: The 
Crisis of Power and Respect in First Nations Heritage Transactions with 
Canada, in FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND LAW: CASE STUDIES, 
VOICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 465 (Catherine Bell & Val Napoleon, eds., UBC 
Press 2008). 
38 See Oliver Metzger, Making the Doctrine of Res Extra Commercium Visible 
in United States Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 615, 641 (1996). 
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literature dealing specifically with the barriers to repatriation and 
return, and why these barriers exist. While some of the more 
thorough orienting studies on the subject contain sections that 
briefly mention the barriers to repatriation and return, finding a 
solution requires an in-depth analysis.39 Second, the in-depth 
analysis needed requires both a practical assessment of the material 
and legal reality as to why these barriers exist as well as a rigorous 
theoretical assessment. Third, for this theoretical assessment to find 
potential application, a methodology is required—a methodology 
through transsystemia as well as through legal pluralism. Fourth, 
while res extra commercium appears in various discussions related 
to cultural property, primarily in terms of civil law jurisdictions, 
there has not been an exploration of the complete application of the 
notion across legal traditions through the use of legal pluralism that 
would ultimately lead to decommodification of potent cultural 
objects in the context of repatriation and return.40 
 
II. THE “CULTURAL OBJECT” 
A cultural object forms part of the generally defined cultural 
heritage and property of a particular cultural group.41 The definition 
of a cultural object within the international legal framework appears 
in Articles 1, 4, and 13(d) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (“1970 UNESCO 
Convention”).42 According to these provisions, states are at liberty 
                                                                                                                                     
39 See, e.g., FORREST, supra note 1; IRINA A. STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL 
PROPERTY LAW: A COMMENTARY TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW (Edward Elgar 2011). 
40 See, e.g., Keith Siehr, The Protection of Cultural Heritage and International 
Commerce, 6 INT’L. J. CULTURAL PROPERTY 304, 306 (1997); Metzger, supra 
note 38; Alessandra Lanciotti, The Dilemma of the Right to Ownership of 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: The Case of the 'Getty Bronze, in CULTURAL 
HERITAGE, CULTURAL RIGHTS, CULTURAL DIVERSITY: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (Silvia Borelli & Federico Lenzerini, eds., Martinus 
Nijhoff 2012); FORREST, supra note 1; STAMATOUDI, supra note 39. 
41 Controversy exists concerning whether the correct way of viewing this 
material should be through the lens of cultural property or cultural heritage. 
Much has been written on this debate and is not within the scope of the present 
Article. See, e.g., Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage, 
115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 641 (2011). 
42 International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention Concerning Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 (June 27, 
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to delineate the parameters of their cultural property as long as the 
property in question: 1) is of importance in terms of archaeology, 
prehistory, history, literature, art, and science; and 2) belongs to one 
of the categories appearing in Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention.43 However, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention On 
                                                                                                                                     
1989) (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). UNESCO is the acronym for the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation. According to Article 
1 of its Constitution, UNESCO is tasked with assuring "the conservation and 
protection of the world's inheritance of works of art and monuments of history 
and science" and is thus authorized under Article 2(a) and (c) to "recommend 
such international agreements as may be necessary." Constitution of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 4 U.N.T.S. 275, art. 
IX (Nov. 16, 1945) (entered into force Apr. 7, 1948). Convention on the Means 
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property, Oct. 12–Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 
[hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention]. 
43 See also FORREST, supra note 1, at 36–37. 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra 
note 42; The categories are: 
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals 
and anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest; 
(b) property relating to history, including the history of 
science and technology and military and social history, to the 
life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to 
events of national importance; 
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular 
and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; 
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or 
archaeological sites which have been dismembered; 
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as 
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; 
(f) objects of ethnological interest; 
(g) property of artistic interest, such as: 
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by 
hand on any support and in any material (excluding 
industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by 
hand); 
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any 
material; 
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; 
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any 
material; 
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents 
and publications of special interest (historical, artistic, 
scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in collections; 
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in 
collections; 
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and 
cinematographic archives; 
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Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects (“1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention”)44 specifically introduced the notion of a “cultural 
object.”45 These conventions provide sterilized definitions of objects 
                                                                                                                                     
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and 
old musical instruments. 
44 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Convention on 
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 34 I.L.M. 1322, art. 2, annex 
(June 24, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 UNIDROIT Convention]. UNIDROIT is the 
acronym for the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, an 
independent intergovernmental organization situated in Rome and established in 
1926. 
45 The definition of a "cultural object" is the product of a compromise between 
the desire for a general definition, which some feared was too expansive, and an 
enumerative definition, which some feared was too restrictive. The result of this 
contested issue is the appearance of (1) a general definition for "cultural object" 
in Article 2 of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. Id. at art. 2, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/1995-convention (An 
object that “on religious or secular grounds, [is] of importance for archaeology, 
prehistory, history, literature, art or science.”); which must then also belong to 
one of the categories listed in a separate annex at the end of the Convention:  
 
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and 
anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest; 
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science 
and technology and military and social history, to the life of 
national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of 
national importance; 
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and 
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; 
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological 
sites which have been dismembered; 
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as 
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; 
(f) objects of ethnological interest; 
(g) property of artistic interest, such as: 
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by 
hand on any support and in any material (excluding 
industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated by 
hand); 
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any 
material; 
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; 
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any 
material; 
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and 
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, 
literary, etc.) singly or in collections; 
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; 
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic 
archives; 
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that hold great meaning to the source states and indigenous groups, 
and the contexts where they originated. This sterilization reveals 
part of why existing frameworks for cultural property and heritage 
law are problematic for source countries and indigenous groups in 
demonstrating the importance that an object carries to them.46  
 
A. The Potent Object 
Welsh describes the “potent object” as follows: “Humans 
saturate tangible objects—whether sacred or not—with a quality we 
can call ‘potency’: that is, an individual object has the potential to 
embody and project simultaneously a multitude of meanings and 
interpretations.”47 Welsh chooses the term “potent” in place of 
words such as “religious” or “sacred” because the “potent object” 
encompasses not only the often-sacred characteristics of these 
objects, but it extends beyond the sacred to refer to objects that 
derive importance from the centrality to a claimant state or group’s 
political, economic, moral, and religious domains.48 This is much 
broader than the sectarian connotations of terms such as “sacred” or 
“ceremonial,” yet also more neutral and fluid in allowing for the way 
in which an object’s potency may shift and evolve over time.49 To 
that end, potency is less mired in Western and Eurocentric notions 
of what constitutes the delimited “sacred” object. Potency better 
expresses the invaluable, nuanced, and priceless nature of cultural 
objects and acknowledges the facet of political reasons for 
repatriation and return.50 Welsh suggests that to call an object potent 
is equivalent to identifying it, in Western and Eurocentric 
terminology, as scientifically significant where the way in which an 
object is scientifically significant, or potent, may shift over time.51 
 
                                                                                                                                     
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old 
musical instruments. 
See also STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 72. 
46 See, e.g., Sarah Harding, Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 291, 297–304 (1999) [hereinafter Harding, Value]; Michael E. Harkin, 
Object Lessons: The Question of Cultural Property in the Age of Repatriation 91 
J. de la Société des Américanistes 9, 15–17 (2005). 
47 Welsh, supra note 36, at 856. 
48 Id. at 857–58. 
49 Id. at 858. 
50 Id. at 862–63. 
51 Id. at 858. 
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B. The Actors 
The actors in projects of repatriation and return can be broadly 
separated into: 1) the sources from whom cultural objects were 
removed; and 2) the destinations where these cultural objects are 
now located.  
Within the category of source countries, claims are often 
instituted by a state or by indigenous groups found within a state’s 
territory. Indigenous groups seeking the return of cultural objects 
currently located outside of the territory of the state will sometimes 
have their interests represented internationally by the state or will 
act as their own representatives.52 An additional dimension that must 
be dealt with is whether the cultural object in the destination state is 
owned or possessed by a public government controlled agency, such 
as a museum, or whether it is in the hands of an individual collector 
or private gallery.53 
 
III. REASONS FOR SEEKING THE REPATRIATION AND RETURN OF 
POTENT CULTURAL OBJECTS 
A. Conflicting Perceptions of Value: Cultural Internationalism 
Versus Cultural Nationalism 
The importance that repatriation carries to source groups and 
countries is recognized in key international documents such as the 
United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP).54 The repatriation of cultural objects is sought due to 
                                                                                                                                     
52 FORREST, supra note 1, at 148. 
53 Catherine Bell, Restructuring the Relationship: Domestic Repatriation and 
Canadian Law Reform, in PROTECTION OF FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL 
HERITAGE: LAWS, POLICY, AND REFORM 15, 57 (Catherine Bell & Robert K. 
Paterson, eds., UBC Press 2009) [hereinafter Bell, Restructuring]; Catherine 
Bell & Robert K. Paterson, International Movement of First Nations Cultural 
Heritage in Canadian Law, in PROTECTION OF FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL 
HERITAGE: LAWS, POLICY, AND REFORM 78, 90 (Catherine Bell & Robert K. 
Paterson, eds., UBC Press 2009) [hereinafter Bell & Paterson, International 
Movement]. 
54 UNDRIP, supra note 2: 
 
Article 11 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their 
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to 
maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and 
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their inherent value,55 which John Henry Merryman famously 
divided into two binary perspectives:56 1) cultural internationalism, 
or the Universalist perspective, where cultural objects carry a 
universal value for all humankind;57 and 2) cultural nationalism, 
which views the value of a cultural object as derived from its 
originating context.58  
The first perspective places greater importance on universal 
access to the cultural object and views cultural heritage as belonging 
to all of mankind. As a result, the importance of international 
research and scholarship are viewed as paramount and the return of 
objects to claimants may be resisted where claimants are seen as 
lacking proper academic training to maximize the research and 
educational potential of the object.  
Within this perspective, cultural objects are tied to their market 
value and viewed as valuable resources to be exported and best 
managed through free market principles—the party who is willing 
to invest the most in purchasing a cultural object will be the most 
                                                                                                                                     
historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and 
visual and performing arts and literature. 
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, 
which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, 
religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and 
informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and 
customs. 
 
Article 12 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop 
and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and 
ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in 
privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and 
control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation 
of their human remains. 
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of 
ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession through 
fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in 
conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned. 
55 Harding, Value, supra note 46, at 316; FORREST, supra note 1, at 3–7. 
56 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 
AM. J INT’L L. 831 (1986). 
57 See, e.g., The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, art. I (May 14, 1954); FORREST, 
supra note 1, at 11–13. Merryman is a proponent of this view. See, e.g., 
Merryman, Public Interest, supra note 15. 
58 FORREST, supra note 1, at 5. 
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likely to properly preserve it.59 Since cultural internationalism is 
highly concerned with the proper preservation of cultural objects, 
the fact that claimants may not have proper museum facilities within 
which to house the objects,60 or that claimants may intend to use the 
returned cultural objects for ceremonial, sacred, or other purposes, 
can be a terrifying prospect for proponents of this worldview. This 
is especially the case for those who have spent much of their careers 
carefully watching over the precise humidity and temperature levels 
surrounding the cultural object in question. It is these types of 
concerns that can sometimes lead cultural internationalists to argue 
against the repatriation and return of cultural objects and to argue 
that everyone—including museums, dealers, and collectors—should 
have a say in decisions involving potent cultural objects, rather than 
allowing the voices of the claimants of the objects to take 
precedence.61  
The second perspective focuses on the repatriation of the 
cultural object to its place and culture of origin in order to enable a 
thick and contextual understanding of the object and its value.62 This 
perspective is also concerned with the reality that many cultural 
objects held by institutions for the “universal” benefit often do not 
display all items and keep many of these meaningful cultural objects 
in storage, thus leaving them inaccessible to the public for many 
years.63 In addition, the cultural nationalist perspective may, not 
unlike the Universalists, insist on the importance of housing 
returned objects in facilities that optimize physical preservation as 
well as ongoing research involving the objects.64 Proponents of this 
                                                                                                                                     
59 Coombe & Turcotte, supra note 37, at 261. 
60 Bell & Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 97. 
61 STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 21; Coombe & Turcotte, supra note 37, at 
261. 
62 See, e.g., ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS, Vol. 1 at 187 (Joseph A. 
Buttigieg, ed., Joseph A. Buttigieg & Antonio Callari, trans., Columbia Univ. 
Press 1992). 
63 Bell & Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 97. 
64 Id. See also Catherine Bell et al., Recovering from Colonization: Perspectives 
of Community Members on Protection and Repatriation of Kwakwaka’wakwa 
Cultural Heritage, in FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND LAW: CASE 
STUDIES, VOICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 33, 75 (Catherine Bell & Val Napoleon, 
eds., UBC Press 2008) [hereinafter Bell et al., Recovering]. Situated in Alert 
Bay, British Columbia, the U’mista Cultural Center operates a cultural education 
museum-calibre facility for housing and preserving cultural objects and 
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view argue against housing an object in its place of origin because 
this fails to maximize the object’s research and education potential. 
In a certain sense, interlaced within both of these perspectives 
are concerns with the preservation of the cultural object as 
something of invaluable worth.65 While cultural internationalism 
favors care of the cultural object to be placed with institutions such 
as the “universal museum,”66 cultural nationalism asks that the 
cultural object be placed with those who have the greatest potential 
understanding, connection, and contextual appreciation of the 
object.67 Additionally, a removed cultural object may in fact satisfy 
the goals of both perspectives in terms of access, understanding, and 
context if it is returned to its place and landscape of origin.68  
Since preservation places value on a lack of change over 
flexibility, it is important to question who truly values this 
stagnation, museumification, and freezing of a cultural object as a 
relic of past peoples, and the past “Other.”69 Placing greater 
importance on a lack of potential change for these important cultural 
objects ignores the ongoing and dynamic potent nature they carry 
for today’s people. As Welsh succinctly notes, “[p]reserving one’s 
                                                                                                                                     
information for the future by trained individuals. Associated ongoing research is 
also conducted by the U’mista. See also U’MISTA CULTURAL SOCIETY, 
http://www.umista.org (last visited May 16, 2016). 
65 FORREST, supra note 1, at 14–18. 
66 The notion of the "universal museum" arose as a reaction by numerous 
leading museums (including but not limited to the British Museum, the Musée 
du Louvre, the Museo Nacional del Prado, the Solomon R Guggenheim 
Museum, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art) to increasing demands for 
repatriation and return of cultural objects to source countries and source 
indigenous groups; the result of which was the 2002 Declaration on the 
Importance and Value of Universal Museums. The universal museum is seen as 
an institution that promotes cultural diversity and cultural exchange by keeping, 
showing, and studying the cultural heritage and cultural objects of source 
countries and source indigenous groups. See FORREST, supra note 1, at 164–65; 
WITNESSES TO HISTORY: A COMPENDIUM OF DOCUMENTS AND WRITINGS ON 
THE RETURN OF CULTURAL OBJECTS 116–18 (Lyndel V. Prott, ed., UNESCO 
2009), http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/ICOM_News/2004-
1/ENG/p4_2004-1.pdf. The declaration is from the perspective that "[t]he 
diminishing collection such as these would be a great loss to the world's cultural 
heritage." Id. at 118. 
67 FORREST, supra note 1, at 15. 
68 This argument is often advanced in relation to the Elgin Marbles. Bell & 
Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 97–98; see also 
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 30. 
69 Welsh, supra note 36, at 838. 
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own culture and preserving another’s culture are two very different 
things. Preserving one’s own culture is an expression of human 
rights, while working to preserve someone else’s culture without 
their input or participation is, at best, paternalism.”70 And as Welsh 
warns, “In its most insidious form, cultural preservation can freeze 
people in an ahistorical moment. Such an approach to cultural 
preservation raises visions of dusty shelves filled with murky jars of 
pickled things. Cultures cannot be preserved that way.”71 
 
B. The Potent Object and Identity 
The importance of a cultural object is inextricably linked to 
identity72—whether this is a national identity, a subaltern or cultural 
group identity, or otherwise. Cultural objects provide a cultural 
context through which the individual and community interact and 
differentiate themselves, leading to identity formation. Cultural 
objects are deeply connected to the cultural, spiritual, and political 
lives of individuals and groups and physically define the output of 
the group’s cultural and creative generative process.73 Catherine 
Bell notes that it is for this reason that the control, removal, and 
destruction of potent cultural objects remains such a powerful means 
of domination.74 
 
C. The Potent Object and Knowledge Retention, Creation, and 
Revival 
The value of a cultural object to the identity of a group is 
connected to its role in maintaining a state or indigenous group’s 
knowledge of its culture, traditions, and history. Indigenous groups 
are often apprehensive about dissipating cultural knowledge, and the 
return and repatriation of cultural objects is viewed as invaluable 
due to the educational potential of the objects and the cultural 
                                                                                                                                     
70 Id. at 839. 
71 Id. at 840. 
72 Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 89–90; STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 
217; Elizabeth M. Koehler, Repatriation of Cultural Objects to Indigenous 
Peoples: A Comparative Analysis of US and Canadian Law, 41 INT'L LAW. 103, 
106 (2007). 
73 Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 23; Harding, Value, supra note 46, at 
335. 
74 Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 23; Harding, Value, supra note 46, at 
335. 
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knowledge they embody.75 The creation of future knowledge and 
traditions is seen as connected to the presence of these important 
cultural items in their context of origin.76  
 
D. Economic Dimension 
An economic dimension may also play a role in the desire to 
have potent cultural objects repatriated or returned. A source state 
or source indigenous group may profit from tourism and 
employment opportunities generated from the repatriation and 
return of their cultural objects.77 In some cases, this may result in a 
transfer of the profit-generating potential of a cultural object from 
the hands of the destination state or institution from where it is being 
repatriated or returned, to the source state or indigenous group.  
 
E. Decolonization, Self-Determination, and Reparation 
The repatriation and return of cultural objects are often sought 
in decolonization efforts and as a means of reparation for the past 
injustices of colonization.78 The value of cultural objects in this 
context is linked to self-determination and the ability of source states 
and source indigenous groups to control the potency of the object 
and the depiction, viewing, and access to images and information 
related to their histories and cultures.79 The potent nature of the 
object in question may dictate that it only be displayed or used in 
certain manners and context that are not understood or adhered to in 
the object’s removed location.80  
                                                                                                                                     
75 Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 90, 92–93. 
76 FORREST, supra note 1, at 15. 
77 Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 90; Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 
24; P.J. O'Keefe, Repatriation of Sacred Objects, in WITNESSES TO HISTORY: A 
COMPENDIUM OF DOCUMENTS AND WRITINGS ON THE RETURN OF CULTURAL 
OBJECTS 225, 226 (Lyndel V. Prott, ed., UNESCO 2009) [hereinafter O’Keefe, 
Repatriation]; Kathryn Lafrenz Samuels, Material Heritage and Poverty 
Reduction, in HERITAGE AND GLOBALISATION 203 (Sophia Labadi & Colin 
Long, eds., Routledge 2010). 
78 Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 87; Bell & Paterson, International 
Movement, supra note 53, at 93; Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 19. 
79 Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 93; Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 
24–25. See also JENNIFER KRAMER, SWITCHBACKS: ART, OWNERSHIP, AND 
NUXALK NATIONAL IDENTITY 90 (UBC Press 2006); Welsh, supra note 36, at 
857–58. 
80 For example, Hopi kachina masks are not to be put on exhibit as they are 
considered to be disembodied parts of kachinas. Welsh, supra note 36, at 860. 
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IV. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE REPATRIATION 
AND RETURN OF CULTURAL OBJECTS 
 
A. International 
 
1. The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention 
While legal frameworks for the repatriation of cultural objects 
have existed internationally for some time and provide a basic 
mechanism for repatriation, the reality is that no effective 
international mechanism exists that requires destination states to act 
in response to appeals by source states or groups for the return of 
potent cultural objects.81 Currently, the two primary conventions are 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention.  
The aims of the 1970 UNESCO Convention sought an 
international, uniform, base level of protection against the illicit 
trafficking of cultural objects.82 As a public law instrument, it 
applies to relations between states that are party to the Convention 
but provides no rights or recourse to private parties.83 Article 7(b)(ii) 
of the 1970 UNESCO Convention specifically addresses the return 
of cultural objects to source states where destination states are 
instructed: 
 
[A]t the request of the State Party of origin, to take 
appropriate steps to recover and return any such 
cultural property imported after the entry into force 
of this Convention in both States concerned, 
                                                                                                                                     
Yet this has often been completely disregarded by non-Hopi in the public and 
private displays of kachina masks that were removed from the Hopi in the past. 
It is these same potent cultural objects that the Hopi were recently unable to 
reclaim and were unsuccessful in having their sale delayed from Drouot auction 
house in France. See infra Part VI.B.1; Associated Press, Auction House Ignores 
Pleas to Delay Sale of Hopi Masks: Auction Makes $1.6 million US, CBC NEWS 
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/arts/auction-house-ignores-pleas-to-
delay-sale-of-hopi-masks-1.2456664. Bell & Paterson, International Movement, 
supra note 53, at 93. 
81 See also id. at 102. 
82 STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 33. 
83 Id. at 33. 
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provided, however, that the requesting State shall 
pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or to 
a person who has valid title to that property. Requests 
for recovery and return shall be made through 
diplomatic offices. The requesting Party shall 
furnish, at its expense, the documentation and other 
evidence necessary to establish its claim for recovery 
and return. The Parties shall impose no customs 
duties or other charges upon cultural property 
returned pursuant to this Article. All expenses 
incident to the return and delivery of the cultural 
property shall be borne by the requesting Party.84 
 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention sought to fill gaps identified 
in the 1970 UNESCO Convention, notably with regard to private 
law concerns, and also as a “follow-up” to the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention.85 It regulates private law issues in terms of the bona 
fide possessor and applies to both states as well as private parties.86 
It is based on Article 7(b)(ii) of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.87  
The objectives of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention were both 
to contribute to the fight against the illicit international trade of 
cultural objects as well as to establish a uniform set of minimum 
legal rules pertaining to the restitution and return of cultural objects 
between states that are party to the Convention.88 It did not apply to 
domestic claims of theft or for the domestic repatriation of a cultural 
object.89 The convention is characterized by two different regimes 
in dealing with return (and restitution) of cultural objects. The first 
deals with “restitution of stolen objects,” and the second deals with 
“the return of illegally exported objects.”90 The 1995 UNIDROIT 
                                                                                                                                     
84 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 42, at art. 7(b)(ii). 
85 Patrick O’Keefe, Using UNIDROIT to Avoid Cultural Heritage Disputes: 
Limitation Periods, in CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF 
CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, AND COMMERCE 389, 390 (James A.R. Nafziger & 
Ann M. Nicgorski, eds., Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) [hereinafter O’Keefe, 
UNIDROIT]; STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 67. 
86 STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 33. 
87 Id. 
88 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, Preamble.  
89 See also STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 69. 
90 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44. See also Barbara T. Hoffman, 
Introduction to Parts II and III: Cultural Rights, Cultural Property, and 
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Convention’s role is significant in both avoiding and resolving 
cultural heritage disputes.91  
The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention are complimentary in their goals but are characterized 
by a difference in their means.92 They both also suffer from a 
number of problems, including their lack of ratification by certain 
key countries and enforcement difficulties. For example, Canada has 
signed and ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention but has not 
signed the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention. A number of barriers 
(explored in the sections below) have prevented its widespread 
adoption.  
These international frameworks have limited utility in the 
context of repatriation and return since they deal primarily with the 
illegal removal or theft of cultural objects that have been removed 
after the convention in question has entered into force.93 This is 
highly problematic in dealing with the context of colonial wrongs 
due to the chronological reality of the time period within which 
many of these claimed cultural objects were removed. In addition, 
these international frameworks cannot be directly accessed by most 
source groups since the groups themselves are not parties to the 
conventions—even though the states within which they find 
themselves may be. 
 
2. Other International Mechanisms 
In terms of “soft law,” there are a number of international bodies 
that have developed regulations dealing with cultural property—
consisting primarily of professional codes of ethics. The majority 
are limited to the regulation of particular professions that interact 
with art, collection, and museology. The contributions of these 
mechanisms, while not legally binding, consolidate and promote 
trends and “best practices” within these industries.94  
                                                                                                                                     
International Trade, in ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAW, POLICY, AND 
PRACTICE 89, 90–91 (Barbara T. Hoffman, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006). 
91 O’Keefe, UNIDROIT, supra note 85, at 390. 
92 STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 33. 
93 See, e.g., 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, at art 10. See also 
STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 106. The non-retroactivity of a convention is a 
standard rule within international law. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331., art 28. 
94 STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 159–64. 
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An example of this type of organization is The International 
Council of Museums (ICOM), which is committed to the protection, 
conservation, promotion, and continuation of the world’s natural 
and cultural heritage. ICOM is a non-profit, non-governmental, 
international organization of museums and museum professionals. 
ICOM’s primary focus is the fight against illicit trade in cultural 
property (it partners with UNESCO in this struggle), with a focus on 
prevention.95 It produces a number of awareness-raising 
publications, but its most significant document is its code of 
professional ethics: the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums (“ICOM 
Code”).96 Much of the ICOM Code deals with the acquisition of 
cultural objects, but it also provides for the return of objects.97 In 
doing so, the ICOM Code refers to the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, but also contains the 
reservation that museums must only cooperate if they are legally 
able to—which has allowed some museums to evade claims for 
return by referring to their statutes of operation that disallow them 
from divesting portions of their collection.98  
 
B. Domestic: The Canadian Context 
 
1. Federal 
On a federal level, Canada deals with cultural objects through 
the Cultural Property Export and Import Act (CPEIA).99 This Act 
applies to the export and import of cultural property but does not 
address the repatriation of cultural objects. In contrast to the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) 
passed by the United States Congress in October 1990, Canada does 
not have federal repatriation legislation.100 Nonetheless, repatriation 
                                                                                                                                     
95 Id. at 180–82. 
96 International Council of Museums [ICM], ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums 
(2004) [hereinafter ICOM Code]. 
97 See id. at rules 6.2–6.4. 
98 See, e.g., STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 173. 
99 Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.1 (Can.). 
100 NAGPRA, supra note 5. See also Catherine E. Bell & Robert K. Paterson, 
Aboriginal Rights to Cultural Property in Canada, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 167 (1999) [hereinafter Bell & Paterson, Aboriginal 
Rights]; Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 36. 
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claims within Canada may be addressed by policies put in place by 
government agencies such as Parks Canada.101  
In terms of legislation that specifically addresses Aboriginal 
cultural property, Section 91 of the Indian Act refers to a limited 
number of cultural objects for which the transfer of title and removal 
from the reserve is prohibited “without the written consent of the 
Minister.”102  
 
2. Provincial 
Certain provinces have developed and utilized their own 
repatriation legislation in addressing the repatriation claims of 
indigenous groups in Canada.103 Provinces vary widely in the level 
of protection availed to cultural property. For the most part, 
provinces do not have sufficiently effective legislation to deal with 
repatriation claims.104 Alberta, however, has a comparably higher 
level of protection where, according to the First Nations Sacred 
Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act, “The Minister must agree to 
the repatriation of a sacred ceremonial object unless, in the 
Minister’s opinion, repatriation would not be appropriate.”105 
Nonetheless, a “sacred ceremonial object” is delimited to objects 
that are “vital to the practice of the First Nation’s sacred ceremonial 
traditions.”106 
 
                                                                                                                                     
101 Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 36. See also TASK FORCE, REPORT ON 
MUSEUMS AND FIRST PEOPLES, TURNING THE PAGE: FORGING NEW 
PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN MUSEUMS AND FIRST PEOPLES (3d ed. 1992) [TASK 
FORCE]. 
102 Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 91 (Can.). The enumerated objects include 
only: Indian grave houses, carved grave poles, totem poles, carved house posts, 
and rocks embellished with paintings or carvings. The enumerated objects must 
be located on the reserve for this protection to apply. 
103 See e.g., First Nations Sacred and Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act, 
R.S.A. 2000, c. F-14 (Can. Alta.); Glenbow-Alberta Institute Act, R.S.A. 2000, 
c. G-6 (Can. Alta.); Museum Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 12 (Can. B.C.). See also Bell, 
Restructuring, supra note 53. at 28–43. 
104 See also Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at 
Common Law: A Contextual Approach, 63 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 11 
(2005). 
105 First Nations Sacred and Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act, R.S.A. 2000, 
c. F-14, s. 2(2) (Can. Alta.); Cf. Heritage Conservation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 
187 (Can. B.C.); Ontario Heritage Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O-18 (Can. Ont.) 
106 First Nations Sacred and Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act, R.S.A. 2000, 
c. F-14, s. 1(e)(iii) (Can. Alta.). 
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3. Other 
In addition to the federal and provincial contexts, other 
repatriation provisions can be found contained within treaties. An 
example of this scenario is the Nisga’a Treaty.107 Further, many 
Canadian museums have developed repatriation policies to deal with 
cultural objects and have generally sought to improve their 
relationships with First Nations.108 A number of these policies arose 
subsequent to the debates and recommendations of the Task Force 
on Museums and First Peoples (“Task Force”).109 The Task Force 
addresses the repatriation of sacred objects and cultural patrimony 
and notes the importance of involving First Nations in the 
management of museum collections as well as acknowledging 
internal Aboriginal processes and ownership frameworks and 
systems. For example, the Task Force states:  
 
Even in cases where materials have been obtained 
legally, museums should consider . . . [the] transfer 
                                                                                                                                     
107 Chapter 17 of the treaty was the first time the repatriation of cultural objects 
from a Canadian government institution (notably, the Canadian Museum of 
Civilizations—now known as the Canadian Museum of History—and the Royal 
British Columbia Museum) was specifically dealt with by a Canadian First 
Nation treaty; see Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, S.B.C. 1999, c. 2 (Can. B.C.) 
(enacted provincially in British Columbia); Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, S.C. 
2000, c. 7 (Can.) [hereinafter Nisga’a Treaty] (enacted federally). Catherine E. 
Bell et al., First Nations Cultural Heritage: A Selected Survey of Issues and 
Initiatives, in FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL HERITAGE AND LAW: CASE STUDIES, 
VOICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 367, 368–86 (Catherine E. Bell & Val Napoleon, 
eds., UBC Press 2008) [hereinafter Bell et al., Selected Survey]. 
108 Selected Survey, supra note 107, at 369, 373 (For a more extensive 
discussion of particular Canadian museums and their repatriation polices.). 
109 TASK FORCE, supra note 101. In particular, the Lubicon Lake First Nation’s 
1988 boycott of “The Spirit Sings” exhibit at Calgary, Alberta’s Glenbow 
Museum. This exhibit was hosted as part of the Olympic Art Festival and 
connected to the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympic Games. Briefly, masks lent by 
other museums and institutions were displayed alongside a Mohawk False Face 
mask lent by the Royal Ontario Museum. This mask was at the center of the 
controversy since some of these masks used in Mohawk healing ceremonies are 
regarded as highly sacred and are not to be viewed by non-Aboriginals. Not only 
was the return of the mask sought, but the statement of claim additionally asked 
for an injunction to stop the display of the False Face mask. Catherine E. Bell, 
Graham Statt & the Mookakin Cultural Society, Repatriation and Heritage 
Protection: Reflections on the Kainai Experience, in FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL 
HERITAGE AND LAW: CASE STUDIES, VOICES, AND PERSPECTIVES 203, 212 
(Catherine Bell & Val Napoleon, eds., UBC Press 2008); Bell et al., Selected 
Survey, supra note 107, at 368–69). 
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of title of sacred and ceremonial objects and of other 
objects that have ongoing historical, traditional or 
cultural importance to an Aboriginal community or 
culture. This involves case-by-case negotiation with 
the appropriate communities based on moral and 
ethical factors above and beyond legal 
consideration.110 
 
However, there is no national organization in place to monitor the 
implementation of the Task Force recommendations.111  
 
V. BARRIERS TO REPATRIATION AND RETURN: RELICS OF COLONIAL 
DOMINATION 
The removal, control, and destruction of the cultural objects of 
indigenous groups were tools of domination deployed during 
colonization periods.112 Yet, even after decolonization, efforts 
towards repatriation and return are plagued with barriers that are a 
hegemonic reproduction of colonial wrongs and antithetical to 
efforts to remedy these wrongs.113 Examining the barriers in a post-
colonial context reveals that they constitute colonial relics of 
continued domination of source countries and indigenous groups by 
destination countries. Further, these barriers force non-Western and 
non-Eurocentric norms and values into Western and Eurocentric 
frameworks of legal norms and values.114 This obliges non-
dominant source countries and subaltern, often indigenous, groups 
to speak and act according to the languages and laws of the dominant 
destination countries in articulating claims for repatriation and 
return.115  
                                                                                                                                     
110 TASK FORCE, supra note 101, at 9. 
111 Bell et al., Selected Survey, supra note 107, at 373. 
112 Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 23 (citing Harding Value, supra note 
46, at 335). 
113 See, e.g., Bell, Justifications, supra note 2, at 87. See also Litowitz, supra 
note 13, at 519. 
114 Amanda Pask, Making Connections: Intellectual Property, Cultural 
Property, and Sovereignty in the Debates Concerning the Appropriation of 
Native Cultures in Canada, 8 INTELL. PROP. J. 82 (1993); Rosemary J. Coombe, 
The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims 
in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 249 (1993); 
Noble, supra note 37. 
115 Sharp, supra note 4 at 110-11, referring to Spivak, supra note 4; Noble, 
supra note 37. 
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These barriers are divided into four main categories: 1) time; 2) 
notions of ownership and property; 3) the domestic laws of source 
and destination countries; and 4) costs. These are largely artificial 
divisions since the four are intimately interrelated. When a claim is 
blocked by a limitation period, this is often also linked to diverging 
notions of ownership and property reflected in domestic laws. And 
these three interrelated barriers all carry costly ramifications for 
claimants—whether due to the costs of the ensuing litigation, the 
time, travel, and personal investment required by interested parties, 
the monetary investment required to contravene barriers through 
repurchasing objects, the funds required to successfully meet 
conditions imposed on claimants in most successful repatriation 
claims (such as, “proper” venues to house the object in question), 
and so on.  
While the barriers explored below exist at both the international 
and national level, the challenges they pose are magnified at the 
international level.116  
 
A. Time 
The period of time that has elapsed since the removal of a 
cultural object from its source can pose problems in its repatriation, 
and this is often perceived as the most significant barrier. While time 
limitations are intended to further justice rather than injustice,117 or 
at least where “[c]ontemporary limitations statutes seek to balance 
protection of the defendant with fairness to the plaintiff,”118 it is 
clear that the claiming group or country is at a disadvantage when 
negotiating the legal barriers created by the passage of time. The 
legal permutations of the passage of time are inextricably linked to 
Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks within which source 
groups and countries are forced to formulate their claims. Since their 
claims do not easily fit within the available frameworks, the initial 
                                                                                                                                     
116 Bell & Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 99. For example, 
issues such as language barriers, movement across international borders, 
increased costs due to distance, and unfamiliar laws, policies, and traditions 
exacerbate the existing challenges to return at an international level. Id. 
117 Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 33. 
118 Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14, 
para. 141 (Can.) (referring to Novak c. Bond (1999), 1 S.C.R. 808, para. 66 
(Can.)). 
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colonial wrongs that took place when culturally potent objects were 
removed are maintained. 
Time limitations exist for a number of purposes. In terms of 
private property, they can ensure fairness by protecting the 
reasonable expectations of innocent good faith purchasers and they 
allow for certainty of title in the market.119 Time limitations also 
address logistical issues that become problematic with the passage 
of time, such as evidentiary problems arising from interpreting past 
or present documents or actions by standards not applicable at the 
relevant time, or the death of key actors or witnesses.120  
Countries vary in their treatment of the passage of time and its 
legal results on claims for repatriation and return.121 In common law 
jurisdictions, time limitations, estoppel, laches, or prescription must 
be considered in formulating and treating claims while, within civil 
law jurisdictions, acquisitive prescription (usucapio) and statutory 
limitations generally apply to the treatment of time.122 Nuances exist 
within each country’s legal frameworks that are beyond the scope of 
this project. For the present purposes, this Article provides a general 
overview of relevant time limitations, but with specific reference to 
Canada’s limitations legislation.123  
Broadly, according to the rules of the discoverability principle, 
a limitation period begins to run as soon as the claiming party 
becomes aware (or could be reasonably expected to have become 
aware) of the material facts that form the basis of their claim.124 
Time limitations can be used both as a sword and a shield.125 A 
current possessor of an object may claim to have become the owner 
through the passage of time, thus using the passage of time as a 
sword. Or, the current possessor may use the passage of time as a 
shield by asserting that the claiming party has not brought their 
claim within the applicable time limit.126  
                                                                                                                                     
119 Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 33; Catherine Bell, Limitations, 
Legislation and Domestic Repatriation, 38 U.B.C. L. REV. 149, 151; Kagan, 
supra note 104, at 26. 
120 Bell, Restructuring, supra note 54, at 33. 
121 Siehr, supra note 40, at 306. 
122 STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, ch. 2 n.137; Siehr, supra note 40, at 305–07. 
123 But see, e.g., Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 33–35. 
124 Id. at 33. 
125 Siehr, supra note 40, at 306. 
126 Id. 
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Briefly, a variety of reasons exist for the passage of time 
between the removal of an object and the eventual claim for its 
return. This includes the lack of knowledge of a source group or 
country as to the location of a removed object,127 as well the 
difficulties in tracing cultural objects in the context of international 
borderless trade and the potential housing of an object in a little-
known location.128 The difficulty in tracing objects may also be 
exacerbated by the purposeful hiding of objects. In addition, it 
simply takes time for groups and source states to organize their 
claims for repatriation or return as they begin the slow process of 
recovery from colonization and the mass removal of cultural objects 
from within their borders. 
 
1. Time Internationally 
Internationally, the 1970 UNESCO Convention bears no 
reference to time limitations.129 As a result, parties to the 1970 
UNESCO Convention can apply their respective domestic rules for 
time limitations.130 During the drafting of the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention, however, time limitations became a contentious 
issue,131 and, limitation periods remain the greatest barrier to the 
widespread adoption of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.132  
During the drafting process for the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention, two divergent perspectives on time limitations 
clashed.133 On one side, states generally classified as destinations 
for cultural objects were predominantly in favor of short time limits 
due primarily to a concern for stability in the marketplace. Many of 
these countries had legal systems based on the common law tradition 
where statutes of limitations govern restitution claims once a certain 
period of time passes subsequent to the claimant becoming aware of 
                                                                                                                                     
127 See, e.g., Bell, Restructuring, supra note 53, at 57. 
128 STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 82.  
129 See art. 4 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 42. See also 
Stamatoudi, supra note 6 at 40 
130 O’Keefe, UNIDROIT, supra note 85 at 390. 
131 Stamatoudi, supra note 39 at 63 
132 The UK, for example, identifies limitation barriers as the most significant 
obstacle to their adoption of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention (O’Keefe, 
UNIDROIT, supra note 85 at 390). 
133 Forrest, supra note 1 at 204-206; O’Keefe, UNIDROIT, supra note 86. 
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possessor’s identity.134 The other side was against any time limits at 
all, largely influenced by concerns with morality and justice as well 
as efficient transactions.135 Many of the countries with this other 
perspective had legal systems based on the civil law tradition where 
certain property is deemed inalienable and time limitations do not 
apply, even if the cultural object is attained by a bona fide 
purchaser.136 This clash in perspectives ultimately resulted in the 
need for compromise where certain states insisted on including the 
principle of inalienability137 while others refused to accept a 
convention that included this concept.138 And yet other countries 
were constrained by constitutional reasons that would disallow them 
from implementing a regime without limitation periods.139  
The result of all of this has been the inclusion of a median view 
of time limitations that represents no particular state legal system in 
treating dispossessed owners.140 Generally, the claimant is provided 
a three-year period to make their claim from the time they become 
aware of the location of the cultural object and the identity of the 
possessor, or, a fifty-year period will be in effect.141 Logistically, 
three years does not provide much time for claimants to decide to 
pursue and organize a claim, especially where the removal of an 
object occurred a long time ago, or if internal conflicts exist within 
the source group regarding what action to take after the loss of an 
object is discovered.142  
The fifty-year period is also problematic due to the practical 
effect of the passage of time on evidence that is needed to prove the 
circumstances of the removal, as well as the provenance of the 
                                                                                                                                     
134 Stamatoudi, supra note 39, at 79. 
135 Id. 
136 FORREST, supra note 1, at 204–05. See also O’Keefe, UNIDROIT, supra note 
85, at 395. 
137 For example, France. See FORREST, supra note 1, at 205. See also O’Keefe, 
UNIDROIT, supra note 85, at 393, 395. 
138 For example, the UK, Netherlands, and Switzerland. FORREST, supra note 1, 
at 205 
139 Austria, for example. Id. 
140 STAMATOUDI, supra note 39, at 80. 
141 See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 44, art. 3, para. 3, and art. 5, 
para. 5. This three year period is substantially similar to the discoverability 
principle applied in Canada. 
142 O’Keefe, UNIDROIT, supra note 85, at 391. 
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object.143 The fifty-year period does not account for the reality of 
objects removed in the context of colonialism—where source 
groups and states may take longer than fifty years to mobilize to 
bring a claim, in addition to the logistical time required to trace and 
locate objects. Further, the inability to bring a claim due to, for 
example, force majeure, is not explicitly accounted for.144  
However, pursuant to Article 3(4), the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention does allow for an exception to the fifty-year limitation 
period (only the three-year limitation period will apply) where the 
object in question forms “an integral part of an identified monument 
or archaeological site, or belong[s] to a public collection,”145 or if, 
pursuant to Article 3(8) the claim pertains to “a sacred or 
communally important cultural object belonging to and used by a 
tribal community in a Contracting State as part of that community’s 
traditional or ritual use.”146 This extended time limitation was 
essentially intended to incorporate the principle of inalienability in 
order to speak to the position of a number of countries that apply 
this principle to particular classes of property.147 But the removal of 
the fifty-year overall time limitation is not absolute since, pursuant 
to Article 3(5), the parties to the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are 
able to limit this period to seventy-five years “or such longer period 
as is provided in its law.”148  
Regardless of the compromise represented by the language and 
legal concepts that appear in the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, and 
in addition to the practical problems arising from the three-year and 
fifty-year limitation periods respectively, the wording of the 
provisions that attempt to address inalienability are severely limiting 
for source groups and countries that seek the repatriation of cultural 
objects removed. For example, for an object to be “an integral part 
of an identified monument or archaeological site,” the monument 
must be recorded; however, few monuments have such records.149 
The same applies to archaeological sites where many sites have not 
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been officially “discovered” or documented, such as those pillaged 
by “huaqueros” (those who illicitly excavate archaeological sites 
and/or remove objects from these sites) in parts of Mexico and South 
America. There and elsewhere, archaeological sites have been and 
continue to be frequent targets of illegal excavations, leading to 
many unrecorded objects.150  
In addition, the use of the word “integral” in Article 3(4) of the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention is vulnerable to subjectivity and may 
result in a difficult burden in proving an object’s “integral” nature.  
The third category of potentially exempt objects includes those 
that belong to a “public collection.” Since this is not a term of art, 
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention provides a definition in Article 
3(7). A “public collection” is “a group of inventoried or otherwise 
identified cultural objects” that must be owned by either a: 1) 
contracting state; 2) regional or local authority of a contracting state; 
3) religious institution in a contracting state; or 4) institution that is 
established for an essentially cultural, educational, or scientific 
purpose in a contracting state and must be recognized in the state in 
question as serving the public interest.151  
There are a host of difficulties with this definition. According to 
Article 3(7), cultural objects must consist of more than one object in 
order to form the requisite “group.” But there is no requirement for 
this group of two or more objects to have any sort of unifying 
characteristic or theme. The result, as Patrick O’Keefe suggests, is 
that a public collection is defined by its owner.152 Next, the cultural 
objects must be “inventoried or otherwise identified” by one of the 
enumerated owning entities. O’Keefe criticizes this requirement due 
to the well-known inaccuracies of most inventories, which limits the 
ability to fully claim all of the cultural objects that would otherwise 
form part of the public collection.153 The stipulation that the 
category of potential owners must serve the “public interest” is also 
vulnerable to subjectivity. O’Keefe points out that the collections of 
religious institutions receive special treatment as they receive their 
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own category of potential owners.154 Yet it is difficult to define and 
demarcate what a religious institution consists of and may not 
account for particular spiritual movements.155 
The fourth category of cultural objects that may be exempt from 
the three-year or fifty-year limitation periods is dedicated to stolen 
objects that are identified as “a sacred or communally important 
cultural object belonging to and used by a tribal or indigenous 
community in a [c]ontracting [s]tate.”156 The time limitations 
applied here are the same as those applied to public collections. If 
the cultural object is not “sacred,” then it must be “communally 
important.” But this standard would have to be proven by the 
claiming group in the state where they are making the claim157—and 
this may be difficult to demonstrate where notions of “communally 
important” are not identical across all groups, countries, and people. 
But once “sacred” or “communally important” is proven, the 
claiming party must then show that the cultural object is used “as 
part of that community’s traditional or ritual use.”158 Where the 
cultural object is not for ritual use, then it must be for traditional use. 
Traditional use can be more difficult to establish than ritual use 
because the object must not only be for traditional use, it must also 
be “communally important.” As O’Keefe notes, this may be highly 
problematic for cultural objects used every day by a particular 
family rather than by the community.159 These highly specific 
definitions exemplify the international legal frameworks that 
maintain the logic of the colonizer but within which source groups 
and states must navigate and fit their claims. 
In other contexts, the use of term “culturally significant” to 
designate which cultural objects are fair game for claims for 
repatriation or return present the same uncomfortable reality. 
Between possessing institutions and individuals there is a vast 
difference of opinion regarding what is “culturally significant.”160 
In the context of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, there are no 
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provisions that provide for the competence of the claimant state to 
identify the cultural objects or property that are “culturally 
significant” to it. Instead, the court that assesses a claim is left with 
a margin of discretion that may be problematic where the court in 
question (or the state within which the claim is brought) does not 
view the object as culturally significant or views it simply as a 
commodity to be freely traded on the market.161 
Peru’s claim against Yale for the return of artifacts from Machu 
Picchu is one example of the barriers encountered due to the 
imposition of limitation periods. Since Peru had already made a 
formal demand for the return of these objects in the 1920s, which 
Yale had refused, it became apparent that the seventy-year time 
period that had elapsed since the initial demand and the recent claim 
for the return of these objects would be problematic due to the three-
year statute of limitations applicable to replevin actions.162 In order 
to overcome these barriers—as will be discussed subsequently in a 
later section—extralegal strategies including international 
awareness-raising and public shaming were employed.163 
 
2. Time Domestically: Canada 
Canada’s heritage conservation legislation largely falls within 
the jurisdiction of the provinces and thus differs from province to 
province—the same applies to provincial legislation regarding 
limitation of actions legislation.164 As discussed above in relation to 
limitation periods in most common law jurisdictions, limitation 
periods usually begin at the date of wrongful removal of the cultural 
object. Again, the general principle of fairness is applied in order to 
safeguard possessors of an object from a perpetual threat of being 
sued for the object in question.  
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The same justifications exist at the provincial level for the 
imposition of time limitations: certainty of title, timely settlement of 
disputes, and the protection of good-faith innocent purchasers.165 
Some exceptions exist in repatriation claims in order to account for 
the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action such that the 
limitation period will not begin until the date upon which the fraud 
was discovered or ought to have been discovered. But this does not 
fully account for changes in Aboriginal rights law and the ability to 
effectively determine when Aboriginal claimants knew or 
reasonably ought to have known about their ownership rights over a 
particular object.166 When a limitation period runs out and does not 
fall under an exception, the claimant(s) will have their right to 
ownership extinguished—which, in some cases, may ultimately 
indirectly extinguish a common law Aboriginal right to cultural 
property.167 
 
B. Ownership and Property 
Even if the barriers posed by limitation periods are overcome, 
claims to ownership and possession remain a barrier for a number 
of reasons that largely arise from differing perceptions or 
understanding of ownership and property.168  
 
1. Identifying Origins and Owners 
As time passes, ownership and the provenance of a removed 
cultural object become increasingly difficult to trace. The chain of 
title is obscured as the object is traded from party to party.169 The 
evidence needed to demonstrate provenance may not be sufficient 
in proceedings before the courts in the jurisdiction where the object 
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is currently held and may ultimately make the return of objects 
impossible.170  
In a dispute for the return of pre-Columbian artifacts seized by 
United States Customs from a private individual, the Government of 
Peru had to prove that it was the legal owner of the claimed objects 
at the time that the objects were removed.171 Since Peru could only 
prove national ownership of cultural property from 1929 forward, 
their claim was unsuccessful.172 
The claimant must be able to show a past-present continuity, on 
a balance of probabilities, which may be straightforward where 
claims are made for objects from a well-documented or well-known 
period of time.173 However, this is not the case with many claims, 
and as time passes it becomes increasingly difficult to establish, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, a past-present continuity.174 
A dearth of evidence is also problematic for claims for objects 
that were exported illegally or secretly, as it is difficult to have 
sufficient evidence to prove ownership and the provenance of these 
illegally exported objects.175 
Additionally, the group that initially created the cultural object, 
or the culture that the object can be sourced to, may no longer remain 
as a recognizable entity—thus breaking the continuity of title. An 
example of this is the Nok civilization and Nok art.176 The Nigerian 
government lays claim to these cultural items because the Nok 
civilization once existed within what is now Nigeria. 
The claim for objects that embody a particular culture carries 
additional unique challenges related to the movable nature of the 
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cultural objects in question. Determining which culture an object 
embodies can be problematic since the object could quite easily have 
been transferred between groups or have been left behind and 
appropriated by incoming conquering or occupying groups.  
 
2. Differing Concepts of Ownership and Property 
Beginning with Aboriginal property, concepts of property differ 
from mainstream Western and Eurocentric notions of private 
property where, at base, there exists the assumption that all property 
may be owned by an individual.177 As Brian Tamanaha describes, 
property ownership is a common space of legal pluralistic clashes 
between Western and Eurocentric norms, on the one hand, and non-
Western and non-Eurocentric, on the other.178 Other ways of 
envisioning property—such as communal ownership or collective 
ownership—create problems in claims for repatriation and return as 
they make it more difficult to frame a claim within the available 
legal frameworks that import basic assumptions regarding what is 
acceptable evidence of ownership, chain of title, and possession.  
Collective ownership, for example, focuses on the interests of 
the community, and the community that owns property, rather than 
the individual. However, within the collective, particular individuals 
may benefit from more extensive rights or responsibilities for 
portions of the property that are otherwise held collectively. An 
example would be religious leaders within the collectivity.179 
Communal ownership is much the same as collective ownership, but 
lacks the possibility for particular individuals to benefit from the 
superior right outlined above.180 
In addition, the buying and selling of property—which is such 
an assumed reality within Western and Eurocentric property 
norms—do not necessarily carry an equivalent notion or importance 
within customary normative systems.181 This can make it difficult 
when entering into litigation that requires conventional evidence of 
ownership as well as market values.  
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Property and ownership analogies may certainly be drawn with 
concepts not unfamiliar to those within dominant legal 
frameworks,182 but whether or not the analogies are sufficient to 
communicate alternate conceptions, we are still left with simply 
another means of forcing Aboriginal concepts of property into 
Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks.183 
Domestic repatriation claims are the most palpable examples of 
the problems that arise when subaltern source groups have 
conceptions of ownership that differ from the dominant notions of 
ownership and property of the formal legal frameworks of the 
country in which these groups find themselves.184 In Canada, a good 
example of the incongruence between ownership as structured 
within Western legal frameworks and non-Western perspectives is 
the Echo Mask—the return of which was claimed by the Nuxalk 
Nation.185 According to the laws of the Nuxalk Nation, the mask 
“belongs to the family which has the custody of it and the culture of 
the mask belongs to the Nation. A person in the family holds the 
mask for the family and all people [and is the keeper] of it.”186 The 
two do not fit together when this description of “ownership” forms 
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part of a claim for repatriation structured within Western legal 
frameworks and notions of ownership.187 
Canada, and the United States, have mechanisms that can be 
described as a “blended approach” in accounting for the legal 
pluralistic aspect of repatriation claims from Aboriginal groups 
within state borders.188 Due to the sui generis (unique or “of its own 
kind”) status of Aboriginal rights in Canada, repatriation claims in 
Canadian courts consider Aboriginal perspectives on ownership and 
property along with the common-law principles of property law and 
contract law that characterize the Canadian formal legal 
framework.189 Where the common law principle of nemo dat quod 
non habet (an individual cannot transfer more rights in property 
beyond what the individual has) operates by limiting the transfer or 
sale of an object over which the transferor has not acquired good 
title, Canadian courts determine the acquisition of good title and 
legitimate transfer of property according to Aboriginal laws and 
customs.190 It bears noting that even with acknowledgement of 
Aboriginal laws and customs, there are certain legislated exceptions 
to the nemo dat rule—such as those arising from limitations periods 
in dealing with the purchase and sale of objects in an open market.191 
Internationally, there are also differences between civil and 
common law jurisdictions where conflict of law issues arise related 
to the ability to acquire good title to a stolen object. In common law 
jurisdictions like Canada, the United States, England, Australia, and 
so on, a thief cannot acquire good title and is not able to pass good 
title to a purchaser even if the purchase is done in good faith (nemo 
dat quod non habet). But, in contrast, in civil law jurisdictions such 
as France, Italy, and Spain, a bona fide purchaser can acquire good 
title—although the conditions for this will vary between 
jurisdictions.192  
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In a cross-border context, the laws that will apply in a claim for 
the return of an object may not be the laws of the court where the 
claim is being heard—which may lead to the clash between different 
conceptions of ownership and title. For example, where a court 
applies the lex rei sitae to a claim for the return of an object, 
determining the law of the place where the object was located when 
good title was acquired will depend on perceptions of how and when 
good title can in fact be acquired.193 This will ultimately affect the 
success of a claim for the return of an object. Both source groups 
and source states face this barrier. 
 
C. The Domestic Laws of Source and Destination Countries 
Repatriation and return mechanisms usually refer to the export 
and cultural heritage laws in place in the country of origin at the time 
of the alleged removal of the cultural object and the agreements in 
place between the countries in question when the object was 
removed. This is problematic on a number of fronts. In the context 
of colonization, the formal laws of a source country are often based 
on Western or Eurocentric models and often do not effectively 
account for divergent notions of property and ownership of 
subaltern groups within the state’s borders. But at an even more 
basic level, in dealing with the laws in place at the time of the 
object’s removal, a source country’s export or cultural heritage laws 
frequently pose a barrier in formulating a claim for an object’s return 
since the source state may not have had applicable laws dealing with 
the export of cultural objects—whether this is because the state was 
not a state at the time of the object’s removal or whether these laws 
were not yet created. Or, if the state was in existence at the time of 
removal and even may have had relevant laws in place, it is likely 
that these laws were inadequate to prevent the export and illicit 
removal of the object—often due to colonial rule unconcerned with 
such matters. Further, current agreements in place between the 
countries in question may not yet have been created and agreed upon 
at that point in time; or applicable international mechanisms for 
return and repatriation may not have been in force at the time of the 
object’s removal. 
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Peru has faced numerous difficulties in claiming the return of 
items that were removed before laws relating to cultural heritage 
were in place as well as difficulties due to the inadequacy of these 
laws even when they came into effect. In Peru v. Johnson, for 
example, the claimant was unable to successfully prove its 
ownership of the removed objects under its own heritage laws in 
place at the time of export, which was exacerbated by the claimant’s 
inability to ascertain the exact date of removal in order to establish 
the precise laws that would have been applied at the time of the 
removal of the objects.194 In penning the decision, Judge Gray notes, 
with reference to United States v. McClain, that while “export 
restrictions constitute the police power of a state; ‘[t]hey do not 
create ‘ownership’ in the state’.”195 And referring to a further 
decision in United States v. McClain, Judge Gray also finds that 
even if Peru has considered itself the owner of the cultural objects 
in question, “It has not expressed that view with sufficient clarity to 
survive translation into terms understandable by and binding upon 
American citizens.”196 Ultimately, Peru’s claim for the return of the 
Pre-Columbian artifacts was denied. 
In addition, Yale stubbornly resisted Peru’s attempts to have the 
cultural objects returned that were removed from Machu Picchu at 
various points in time by insisting that its legal title to the objects 
was based on the version of Peru’s civil code in force at the time of 
removal of the objects.197 While the objects have now been returned, 
the reliance on the laws in place in the source country at the time of 
removal were circumvented through extralegal means, which will 
be discussed in subsequent sections, rather than rethought. 
In dealing with the return of removed cultural material in an 
international context, source groups and countries are also 
dependent upon the domestic laws of the destination country 
regarding private international law or conflict of laws in terms of 
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which country’s laws will ultimately apply to the claim for the 
returned cultural object.198 Numerous complicated and seemingly 
unjust situations may occur through the application of conflict of 
laws rules. These complications may occur where, for example, a 
claimant is the victim of the illicit removal of a cultural object to a 
foreign jurisdiction; and when the object is eventually located and 
the case is tried in the claimant’s local court, the claimant is unable 
to recover the object in question because the local court applies the 
law of the foreign jurisdiction, which may protect the rights of a 
good faith purchaser over those of the claimant.199  
 
1. Canada’s Domestic Laws as Barrier 
In Canada, certain categories of cultural property are under the 
control of the CPEIA, which limits the right to sell and trade cultural 
property that is privately owned.200 The limit is intended to keep a 
balance between private interests and the public interest of ensuring 
nationally important cultural objects remain within Canada’s 
borders.201 The Cultural Property Export Control List (“Export 
Control List”) may include objects made by an individual at least 
fifty years ago, but who is presently no longer alive.202 In order to 
export objects within this category, an application must be submitted 
and is subject to the review expert examiners who, according to 
section 11(1) are to decide: 
 
(a) whether that object is of outstanding significance 
by reason of its close association with Canadian 
history or national life, its aesthetic qualities, or its 
value in the study of the arts or sciences; and 
(b) whether the object is of such a degree of national 
importance that its loss to Canada would 
significantly diminish the national heritage.203 
 
If the object fits under this category, then the export permit will 
be denied, though the exporter may still make an appeal to the 
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Review Board.204 Nonetheless, the Review Board can delay the 
export of the object for two to six months in order to give Canadian 
institutions and public authorities—such as museums and 
galleries—the opportunity to prevent the export of the object 
through purchase.205 This mechanism has been helpful in the past 
for First Nations groups to discover and prevent the export of potent 
cultural objects.206 The CPEIA further provides for loans and grants 
that can be applied for by Canadian institutions and public 
authorities in order to aid in the purchase of these objects.207 
While the CPEIA may be helpful in preventing further loss of 
important cultural objects, the past removal of objects—whether 
they were exported before effective export laws were in place or 
whether they were removed and still remain in Canada—are 
generally beyond the non-retroactive scope of the Act. This is the 
case unless the object in question becomes the object of an 
application for an export permit or is an illegally exported object 
from another state that is subsequently imported into Canada.208 But 
even then, the CPEIA, as well as Canada’s cultural heritage laws in 
general, certainly do not effectively address all situations.  
For example, in R v. Heller, the government of Nigeria tried to 
recover a Nok artifact illegally exported from Nigeria that had been 
imported into Canada.209 Even though the substance of the case was 
sound and both Nigeria and Canada were parties to the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, the case ultimately failed in the Alberta 
Provincial Court. In applying Article 7 of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention as incorporated into Canadian law, Justice Stevenson 
ruled that Nigeria was unable to secure the return of the object 
because sufficient evidence could not be adduced to satisfy the 
requirements of Canadian law to establish that the object had been 
removed from Nigeria after June 28, 1978—the date upon which 
Canada and Nigeria became parties to the UNESCO Convention, 
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thus entering into the applied cultural property agreement between 
the two countries.210 As a result, the Convention was deemed to be 
inapplicable.211  
The result had significant cost ramifications for Nigeria and was 
also costly due to the resources needed to pursue this type of claim 
in foreign courts.212 Whether or not the object was in fact removed 
before or after June 28, 1978, this case demonstrates the difficulties 
faced when international claims are made—difficulties that have 
not, as seen above, been remedied by the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention. 
The CPEIA is also subject to misuse and manipulation in a 
number of ways, such as by those who deal in the market of cultural 
objects who may be able to artificially inflate the price of the objects 
within Canada by inventing foreign markets, buyers, or prices, 
which exacerbates the fact that groups must purchase what was 
wrongfully removed from them in the first place.213 
 
D. Cost 
The costs of repatriation and return are significant. States may 
be able to absorb the costs involved with repatriation, but these costs 
may be beyond the means of indigenous groups seeking the 
repatriation and return of cultural objects. 
Costs are manifested in a number of ways, which are magnified 
in the international context. The sources of these costs, to name just 
a few, include: the legal costs associated with commencing and 
maintaining court proceedings in the country where the object is 
currently found; traveling necessary to visit the sites where the 
removed objects are located in order to ascertain their origin and 
identity as well as conduct research; information compiled by 
                                                                                                                                     
210 Id.; Article 7 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides repeatedly that the 
provisions of the Convention apply only to objects removed after the entry into 
force of the Convention in the concerned States. 1970 UNESCO Convention, 
supra note 42. 
211 See also Siehr, supra note 40 at 316. 
212 R v. Heller (1983), 27 Alta. L.R. 2d 346 (Can. Alta.). See also Folarin 
Shyllon, The Recovery of Cultural Objects by African States through the 
UNESCO and UNIDROIT Conventions and the Role of Arbitration, in 
WITNESSES TO HISTORY: A COMPENDIUM OF DOCUMENTS AND WRITINGS ON 
THE RETURN OF CULTURAL OBJECTS 219 (Lyndel V. Prott, ed., UNESCO 2009). 
213 Bell & Paterson, International Movement, supra note 54, at 83–84. 
346 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 4:297 
 
researchers and experts, which also often involves the need for 
translators; and costs resulting from the commodification of potent 
cultural objects that must be purchased in order to secure their return 
can be unaffordable.214 Moreover, if a claim is successful, the costs 
of transporting the cultural objects are high and the return of these 
objects often requires the construction of special facilities.215 
 
1. Litigation and Negotiation Costs 
International claims for the return of potent cultural objects, 
especially where international litigation is involved, are inevitably 
expensive and complex—leading experts to suggest that these sorts 
of claims be seen as a last recourse.216  
In Canada, even though negotiation may provide a less costly 
alternative for Aboriginal groups in resolving repatriation claims 
than litigation,217 its processes can still be unrealistically 
unaffordable and additionally impracticable where successful 
negotiation often depends on agreeing to the imposition of costly 
conditions of return.218 Not every claimant group has the financial 
resources to interact within the legal or business infrastructure 
expected by the possessor of their potent object. 
 
2. Housing Costs 
International negotiations for the return of objects may also 
impose conditions requiring an environmentally controlled facility 
(essentially, a museum-like facility) as part of the agreement for the 
return of the cultural object in question.  
For example, housing the G’psgolox memorial pole in a properly 
climate-controlled environment was one of the costly conditions 
initially imposed upon the Haisla Nation in their claim for its return 
from the Swedish Museum of Ethnography.219 Even though the 
Haisla claimants were not opposed to the rationale behind the 
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condition, and the pole was eventually returned while they were still 
raising funds to create a proper facility,220 the costs of constructing 
such facilities are a financial burden faced by many source groups 
in order to house returned cultural objects illicitly removed from 
their original source. 
Another example is the Nisga’a Foundation’s fundraising 
campaign in order to create the Nisga’a Museum and Cultural 
Center to house the objects and human remains for which the 
Nisga’a have successfully negotiated a repatriation agreement with 
the Canadian Museum of Civilization (now known as the Canadian 
Museum of History) and the Royal British Columbia Museum.221 
While the repatriation agreement imposes no conditions on the 
Nisga’a, as with the Haisla, the Nisga’a recognize the merits of 
keeping certain potent cultural objects within a museum-type venue. 
Nonetheless, this still increases the costs that must be faced in 
repatriating cultural objects, and imposes the Western and 
Eurocentric values of preservation demands upon claimant groups.  
While the CPEIA may provide grants or loans to aid in the cost 
of repatriation or return internationally, these grants often have their 
own cost ramifications. Parallel to the terms imposed by the 
possessing party in many negotiations for return, CPEIA grants may 
also contain terms that dictate that the objects in question be kept in 
a locale that meets preservation specifications as well as public 
access requirements, which are not usually readily available unless 
claimants collaborate with museums, galleries, banks, and so on.222 
This was the case with the grant given to the Nuxalk for the return 
of the Echo Mask.223 In order to meet the stipulations that the mask 
be kept in environmentally controlled case and in a secure but public 
facility, the Echo Mask remains housed in a bank near the Nuxalk 
reserve. It will remain there until enough money has been raised to 
construct and complete a facility on the reserve that meets these 
stipulations.224 This is an example of how not every claimant group 
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has the financial resources to replicate the preservation conditions 
the group that had previously possessed the potent object had 
instituted (and then imposed upon the claimant group as a part of the 
grant needed to have the object returned). 
 
3. Cost of Commodification 
Cultural objects command a high price on the international art 
market, which is highly problematic for source groups when they do 
not have access to extensive funds to repurchase the object.225 Even 
where there may be some recourse to the state within which the 
group is found—such as the loans or grants that can be applied for 
by Canadian institutions and public authorities in Canada under the 
CPEIA—or through private philanthropy, these forms of funding for 
the return of cultural objects are still dependent on the colonizing 
state.  
There are numerous examples of the costly price tags faced in 
securing the return of potent cultural objects. To name a few, the 
U’mista Cultural Society (Kwakwaka’wakwa First Nations) faced a 
price tag of $30,000 (USD) in exchange for the return of the Nowell 
blanket from a private gallery in Ontario,226 and the Nuxalk First 
Nations faced a price tag of $200,000 (Can) for the return of the 
Echo Mask in the possession of an art dealer, even though the mask 
was not a commodifiable object according to Nuxalk law.227 
The U’mista Cultural Society attempted to prevent the export 
and secure the return of a blanket belonging to Chief Charles 
Nowell. The export eventually transpired despite their efforts, and 
the Nowell blanket went up for auction at Sotheby’s in New York.228 
Through CPEIA grants, the U’mista were able to bid a maximum of 
$21,500 (USD), but they were outbid by a private gallery in Ontario 
that bid $24,500 (USD).229 Eventually the Ontario gallery sold the 
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Nowell blanket back to the U’mista for $30,000 (USD) and turned 
a $5,500 (USD) profit on its purchase.230 
Turning to the Nuxalk Echo Mask, “under the laws of the 
Nuxalk Nation, the [Echo Mask] and the prerogatives associated 
with it may only be transferred at a potlatch under the witness of the 
community” and “[t]he mask cannot be sold by an individual and is 
to stay in the community for use in potlatches.”231 Even though the 
Echo Mask, according to Nuxalk law, cannot be sold, in the 1980s 
the elderly woman in possession of the mask was convinced by an 
art dealer to sell him the mask for $35,000 (Can).232 The dealer later 
applied for an export permit under Canada’s CPEIA but his 
application for the permit was ultimately delayed after the Nuxalk 
Nation and other sympathizers were able to secure an injunction.233 
The return of the mask was eventually negotiated out of court, but 
the art dealer’s claims of legitimate title to the mask could not be 
circumvented by the Nuxalk and they ultimately had to face the price 
tag of $200,000 (Can) placed on the object by the art dealer.234 
 
VI. CURRENT LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL STRATEGIES FOR 
OVERCOMING BARRIERS: COLONIALISM MAINTAINED AND 
REPLICATED 
The legal and cost barriers demonstrate how international and 
domestic laws are failing to effectively address legitimate claims for 
the repatriation and return of cultural objects and have led claimants 
to turn to extralegal strategies in the hopes of success. Yet even these 
extralegal strategies operate within Western and Eurocentric 
frameworks and the overarching problematic attribution of market 
value to invaluable potent cultural objects through commodification. 
Commodification is the most significant relic of colonialism faced 
in claims for repatriation and return since it is present both within 
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the barriers that exist in formulating claims for repatriation as well 
as the attempts to overcome these barriers.  
Currently, the appeal to "public feeling" is a popular and 
increasingly successful mechanism used by subaltern cultural 
groups and source states in order to overcome the barriers to 
repatriation and return identified above.235 Cooperation and 
mediation between museums and those claiming repatriation or 
return have also been successful.236 In addition to suggestions to 
alter aspects of the current legal frameworks, non-legal and soft-law 
mechanism may additionally aid in mitigating the barriers to 
repatriation and return.237  
 
A. Legal Strategies to Circumvent the Barriers 
While judicial interpretation that considers the greater social 
context and merits of a claim may yield positive results in 
overcoming some of the challenges posed by barriers such as 
limitations legislation,238 this does not speak to the removal of 
continued imposition of Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks 
on claims for repatriation or return.239 Simply removing time 
limitations for reclaiming illicitly removed objects of a particular 
cultural value and significance is one suggestion provided to break 
down the time barrier for reclaiming illicitly removed objects of a 
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particular cultural value and significance.240 But the removal of time 
limitations is just one piece of the puzzle and does not truly progress 
beyond a Western and Eurocentric assessment of which objects are 
qualified as particularly valuable and significant.  
Additionally, unless specifically addressed by legislation, even 
if limitation periods were removed, the application of the doctrine 
of laches, based in equity, may nonetheless apply.241 If a delay in 
reclaiming is ruled as inexcusable or as due to the acquiescence on 
the part of the delaying party, the reasonable reliance of the current 
possessor may be seen as requiring protection.242 But since the 
doctrine of laches is based in equity, this may control for its unjust 
application.  
Other experts focus on re-conceptualizing ownership and 
property rights in order to better account for differing iterations of 
these concepts that are found in source cultural groups and 
nations.243 This potential solution, while recognizing the merits of 
legal pluralism, only seeks to better account for notions of 
ownership and property rights that “do not fit.” 
At least in the domestic Canadian context, the use of customary 
law can be useful in dealing with repatriation claims in terms of 
demonstrating Aboriginal ownership or control over cultural 
objects.244 But the utility of these approaches may be limited to 
disputes within claimant groups unless they are truly recognized 
through enabling legislation.245 In addition, the applicability of 
customary law in dealing with non-Aboriginal non-governmental 
parties would often still have to be framed through the Western and 
Eurocentric adversarial model in order to account for the legal 
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traditions of both parties.246 Even if an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism were used to better represent the interests of claimant 
groups, conflicting notions of legal concepts, such as property, 
would remain between the parties to the dispute.247 
Internationally, since Aboriginal groups within a country do not 
have standing to bring claims internationally, the national 
government of the state within which the group finds itself must 
instead present the claim. Although customary law might be 
referenced by the state in addressing ownership or control of a 
claimed cultural object, state law will generally prevail.248  
 
B. Extralegal Strategies to Circumvent the Barriers 
 
1. Appeals to "Public Feelings" 
Appeals to “public feeling,” and the shaming of institutions and 
states where removed cultural objects are located, are generally 
accomplished through awareness-raising campaigns. Journalists, 
international media, and famous or influential individuals then pick 
up these campaigns. This will ideally lead to pressure on state 
governments and institutions that face reclamation claims to take 
action and recognize these claims or remove the barriers blocking 
claims already in progress. There is also the financial dimension to 
appeals to public feeling. Benefactors may aid in remedying the cost 
barrier involved in repatriation and return—whether aiding in the 
purchase of an object where that is one of the conditions of return, 
or by becoming the highest bidder at the sale of objects at an auction 
house and then donating the potent objects in question to the 
claiming source group.  
What has been termed “ethics-based repatriation” is observable 
in the dispute that continued for years between the Peruvian 
government and Yale University over the return of cultural objects 
comprising numerous collections removed from Machu Picchu at 
different points in time and held at Yale.249 The tides began to finally 
turn in Peru’s favor when the international media took notice after 
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Peru mounted an awareness-raising social and political campaign 
involving demonstrations held in Peru’s two largest cities, Lima and 
Cuzco, and after a formal request by Peru’s President to United 
States President Barack Obama for his help.250 This even led nine 
Peruvians running in the New York Marathon to don t-shirts in 
support of Peru’s requests for the return of the Machu Picchu 
artifacts and inspired Yale alumni to take up a letter-writing 
campaign.251 Ultimately, this resulted in the public shaming of Yale 
and, while Yale first held strong in its refusal to return the objects, 
eventually ceded to Peru’s requests, leading to the return of the 
entire 1912 and 1916 collections in time for the 100th anniversary 
of American explorer (and later United States Senator and Governor 
of Connecticut) Hiram Bingham III’s arrival in (or, in colonizing 
terms, his “discovery of”) Machu Picchu.252 
Within Canada’s domestic context, the attention paid by 
journalists and international media to the U’mista Cultural Society 
(Kwakwa̱ka̱ʼwakwa First Nations) claim for the return of a 
Transformation Mask from the British Museum led to a shift in the 
uncompromising position of both parties and eventual resolution of 
the dispute via a long-term loan of the Transformation Mask and its 
relocation to the U’mista Cultural Center.253 
Where public funding—for example, through the CPEIA—
provides a means to waylay some of the costs for claimants to have 
their potent cultural objects returned to them through purchase, 
increasingly private philanthropy is providing an alternate means of 
funding these purchases.254 For example, France’s Drouot auction 
house recently sold dozens of sacred ceremonial masks and hoods 
in December of 2013, despite the Hopi and San Carlos Apache 
tribes’ attempts in court to block the sale of the masks and the United 
States Embassy’s requests for delaying the sale on behalf of the Hopi 
and San Carlos Apache so that the tribes could identify whether they 
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could formulate a claim pursuant to the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention.255  
Numerous barriers blocked Hopi efforts to reclaim the masks, 
such as difficulty in proving the “ownership” or provenance of the 
masks,256 but private philanthropy ultimately enabled a return of 
some of the masks despite the barriers faced. Even though the masks 
sold quickly at auction for approximately $1.6 million (USD) to the 
dismay of the claimants, it turned out that the Annenberg 
Foundation had noticed the plight of the Hopi and San Carlos 
Apache tribes in their struggle to have these potent cultural objects 
returned, and had secretly bought up many of these important 
cultural objects in order to return them to their place of origin in 
Arizona.257  
 
2. The “Caring-and-Sharing,” or Collaborative Approach 
The Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and 
Transfer of Cultural Material (“Principles”), developed by the 
International Law Association’s Cultural Heritage Law Committee, 
are a mechanism specifically targeted at the avoidance and 
resolution of disputes related to cultural property.258 The 
International Law Association adopted the Principles in 2006 with 
the intent of having the Principles as an international minimum 
standard.259 Their goal is to encourage cooperation, collaboration, 
and the establishment of a middle ground between parties with 
competing claims as well as a focus on the sharing of cultural 
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heritage objects.260 The emphasis is on the protection and interests 
of the object itself rather than on the competing claims to the 
object.261 The Principles also address alternatives to the direct return 
of cultural objects through mechanisms like loaning the object, 
creating a replica, and sharing in the management and control of the 
cultural object in question.262  
An example of this collaborative approach is the return of the 
G’psgolox totem pole from the Museum of Ethnography in 
Stockholm to the Haisla Nation on the Northern coast of British 
Columbia.263 The return of the pole was conditional upon its 
placement in a state-of-the-art climate controlled facility, which did 
not exist at the time and was costly to build, but was nonetheless 
agreed upon. The Haisla also carved a replacement replica pole and, 
in a gesture of reciprocity, gave it to the Museum of Ethnography as 
part of the efforts they undertook to repatriate the pole.264 While 
barriers to the return of the pole initially hindered Haisla efforts, the 
satisfactory resolution of the conflict over the desired return of the 
pole was eventually achieved through use of these methods.  
The Principles are progressive in their encouragement of 
institutions to work with and respond to requests for the return of 
cultural objects from source countries and groups regardless of 
whether or not the state within which the institution is located 
supports or acknowledges the request.265 As the Principles clearly 
target public ownership and collections, they do not address 
privately owned and collected objects.266 Although no panacea, in 
working around barriers to repatriation and return, cooperation 
between interested parties is certainly an accessible and effective 
tool. 
Where it is impossible to overcome barriers, the last recourse, 
linked to the collaborative approach, may be to arrange a loan where 
the state or an institution within which a claimant group is located 
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holds the cultural object. This may also be viewed as an interim 
solution, or even one that is in line with alternative views of 
ownership. For example, in Canada, if a court finds that a province 
has a valid legislative objective, and that this objective is enforced 
in a manner that is consistent with its fiduciary obligation, the direct 
return of a cultural object to an Aboriginal community may be 
refused on face value.267 While it would be unfortunate if the 
interests of Aboriginal communities in their cultural objects were to 
be placed second to, for example, the interests of the broader 
Canadian public in the presentation, protection, or display of these 
cultural objects, a co-management or loan arrangement may be a 
better alternative than none at all.268 
All of these mechanisms, however, are often unpredictable and 
unreliable, and the alternatives to direct return of the cultural object, 
such as loans, do not necessarily remove the colonial gaze on an 
invaluable potent cultural object that must be “borrowed” in order 
to return to its rightful home.269 Ultimately, these mechanisms are a 
decent last resort, but source countries and source groups should not 
be at the mercy of compromise simply because their claims cannot 
be fit into Western and Eurocentric frameworks, norms, and 
understandings. The bottom line is that most of the suggested 
methods of overcoming these barriers to repatriation and return only 
serve to further reinforce Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks 
and norms since these potential solutions continue to engage with 
these same frameworks.270 As such, the most prescient strategy 
moving forward would be to step outside of existing frameworks; 
question the entire way in which potent cultural objects are currently 
perceived through the colonizer’s gaze, and more thoroughly 
involve a legal pluralistic approach to better account for the laws 
and traditions of source countries and indigenous groups.  
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VII. REMOVING THE COLONIZER'S GAZE: NEUTRALIZING 
COMMODIFICATION 
The barriers to the repatriation and return of cultural objects, 
along with current and potential contravening solutions, share a 
problematic underlying fixation on Western and Eurocentric notions 
of market value that permit a monetary worth to be placed on 
cultural objects and leaves them in a commodified state. As noted 
previously, cultural objects as potent objects are invaluable to source 
states and indigenous groups. Yet even the arguments in support of 
repatriation and return are framed within the discourse of value.271 
In general, civil law frameworks recognize the notion of 
inalienability while common law systems do not.272 However, even 
civil law frameworks have not effectively applied this notion to 
repatriation and return claims,273 and the notion of the good faith 
purchaser often nullifies inalienability.  
Western and Eurocentric notions of value imposed on potent 
objects within current frameworks for repatriation and return 
constitute the colonizer’s gaze and a Gramscian imposition of the 
colonizer’s cultural hegemony.274 To respond in a manner more 
appropriate to true decolonization (and in better accordance with the 
principles laid out in UNDRIP, especially Articles 11 and 12),275 
innovative solutions that move beyond the hegemony of dominant 
Western and Eurocentric values and legal frameworks must be 
sought out. To that end, subsequent to the following situating 
discussion of the colonizer’s gaze and commodification, this Article 
will next turn to the notion of res extra commercium.  
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A. The Commodification of Cultural Objects 
The commodification of cultural objects is certainly not a new 
concept. Once these objects were subsumed under the colonizer’s 
gaze, their commodification quickly occurred as they became highly 
sought after curiosities coveted by amateur anthropologists, intrepid 
collectors, and museums. But globalization has further led to the 
increasing importance of culture as a marketable resource.276  
Arjun Appadurai, referring to Igor Kopytoff’s general theory of 
commodity pathways, suggests that all things, at some point in their 
lives, become commodities.277 Some things, however, such as 
sacred things, are “enclaved commodities” and may be precluded 
from commodification.278 Appadurai and Kopytoff refer to these 
things as “terminal commodities,”279 or “objects which, because of 
the context, purpose, and meaning of their production, make only 
one journey from production to consumption.”280 Subsequent to this 
divergence from the path of commodification, which occurs as soon 
as these objects are produced,281 “they are sometimes used in casual 
domestic ways, [but] they are never permitted to enter the 
commodity state.”282 It is thus impossible for these objects to 
subsequently become commodities. Appadurai goes on to explain 
that “[w]hat makes them thus decommodified is a complex 
understanding of value (in which the aesthetic, the ritual, and the 
social come together), and a specific ritual biography.”283 This calls 
to mind Welsh’s potent object.284 Appadurai’s and Kopytoff’s views 
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on commodification also include the element of legal pluralism 
required for “terminal commodities” to apply within Western and 
Eurocentric frameworks—the diversion of a particular object from 
the path of commodification occurs based on the internal norms and 
understandings of the particular group within which the object is 
produced.285  
Beyond direct involvement in the commercial exchange of 
potent cultural objects, Sarah Harding suggests that museums are 
also involved in the commodification of potent cultural objects 
through a parallel structure.286 She explains that, even though 
museums would resist being accused of “merchandizing” potent 
cultural objects, the very presence of an object in a museum leads to 
a spike in its market value and “prestige,” and may even generate a 
market for the object in the first place.287 But perhaps the most 
inevitable way that museums become involved in the 
commodification of a potent cultural object is the price they must 
place on an object for insurance purposes.288  
In rejecting the commodification of potent cultural objects, 
many Aboriginal groups in Canada have argued against the ability 
for these objects to exist on the market in the first place through the 
establishment of a complete ban on their sale.289 But current 
legislative frameworks do not recognize this option and instead 
remain structured around the notion that these potent cultural objects 
remain a marketable commodity.290 The imposition of 
commodification demonstrates the overarching colonial gaze and 
the Western and Eurocentric norms that pervade current frameworks 
within which claims for repatriation and return must be made. 
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Regardless of the laws and traditions of a claimant group, which 
may dictate that their potent cultural objects do not carry market 
value and thus cannot be sold, claimants are frequently forced to 
interact with the commodification of the objects if they wish to have 
them returned. They often end up purchasing potent cultural objects 
that are not only invaluable to them, but also belong to them and 
were wrongfully removed, which many claimants—such as First 
Nations groups in Canada—understandably find to be offensive.291 
Nonetheless, the market value that these objects now carry to the 
purchasing party is an inevitable reality that claims for repatriation 
and return must deal with as long as these claims must continue to 
be structured within Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks. 
Even exercising extralegal strategies does not nullify the 
commodification that has been applied to potent cultural objects 
once introduced into Western and Eurocentric conceptions. This is 
an example of how, in Gramscian terms, “an unjust social 
arrangement is internalized and endlessly reinforced.”292 
 
B. Owning as Belonging versus Owning as Property 
Brian Noble highlights the difference between practices that 
center around “owning as property” and “owning as belonging.”293 
This is one of the key elements around which the colonial gaze is 
maintained over claims for the return or repatriation of potent 
cultural objects. As Noble explains: “‘Owning as property’ 
describes a system that emphasizes property as a commodity 
capable of individual ownership and alienation for the purposes of 
resource use and wealth maximization.”294 This system 
characterizes the current legal frameworks that exist for framing 
claims for repatriation and return, and it is at the heart of most of the 
barriers described previously. Additionally, extralegal mechanisms 
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and other methods that are used or suggested in order to circumvent 
these barriers either reinforce the misapplication of 
commodification to potent cultural objects or must still function 
within this system.  
In contrast, Noble describes “owning as belonging” as a system 
that views and structures transactions differently. Within this non-
Western, non-Eurocentric, and often subaltern system is the 
assumption that there is an “inextricable connection between people 
and the material and intangible world.”295 That is, people “belong 
indivisibly to their cultural property.”296 In terms of the 
“transaction,” there is a palpable sense of non-severability between 
people and objects, inalienable reciprocity, and an implicit 
expectation of exchange and return. This is in contrast to the 
Western perception of the transaction that centers around alienable 
“property,” trade, and the purchase of consumables with money.297 
Within systems that view owning as belonging, transactions 
involving potent cultural objects seek to build and reinforce 
“relationships of respect and responsibility between people.”298 
 
C. Gramsci and the Imposition of the Colonizer’s Cultural 
Hegemony 
The notion of hegemony is helpful in addressing the dominant 
legal frameworks that must be navigated in claims for repatriation 
or return; “[I]t is a critical tool that generates profound insights about 
the law’s ability to induce submission to a dominant worldview.”299 
In applying this notion to the legal frameworks at play in claims for 
repatriation and return, it is helpful to follow Douglas Litowitz’s 
recasting of Gramscian hegemony.300 Litowitz seeks to modernize 
Gramsci’s initial iteration of hegemony by arguing that hegemony 
should be perceived as a dominant code or “as a mechanism for the 
constitution of a dominant rationality that has become so 
commonsensical that it hardly appears worthy of challenge”—rather 
than as domination by a particular class.301  
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In this manner, the way in which Western and Eurocentric 
principles of property law and notions of ownership exist as 
unavoidable obstacles for the return and repatriation claims of 
source groups speaks to the social control embodied by hegemony; 
“It involves subduing and co-opting dissenting voices through subtle 
dissemination of the dominant group’s perspective as universal and 
natural, to the point where the dominant beliefs and practices 
become an intractable component of common sense.”302  
In order to identify the hegemony operating within claims for 
the repatriation and return of potent cultural objects, the entire 
system must be questioned. “[H]egemony is diagnosed through a 
kind of social criticism where we stand outside of our practices and 
institutions and see that they are one-sided to an extent that we did 
not recognize while we were operating within their boundaries.”303 
In particular, where commodification of these potent cultural objects 
within the current dominant legal framework and free market system 
proves to be such a central and problematic element, then the 
commodifying element must be addressed, resisted, and removed. If 
commodification continues to be accepted in this context, then 
claims for and disputes over potent cultural objects will continue to 
be framed “in the dominant language of the legal system at the time, 
thereby extending the system.”304  
 
D. The Transsystemic Approach as Means of Removing the 
Colonizer’s Gaze and Addressing Cultural Hegemony 
In order to divorce claims for repatriation and return from the 
hegemony of dominant Western and Eurocentric frameworks, it is 
necessary to step outside of these frameworks and the “common 
sense” of the dominant worldview that accepts the commodification 
of potent cultural objects. This can be done through a transsystemic 
approach that reaches under the law in order to excavate notions that 
carry currency across the boundaries of different legal frameworks 
and disregards any hierarchical ordering or valuation that may be 
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accorded to various systems.305 A transsystemic methodology 
displaces and deconstructs legal traditions in a manner that moves 
beyond comparative law.306 By examining the foundations that 
underlie discrete legal frameworks, a more complete understanding 
of their interrelationship can be gained.307 This is helpful in moving 
beyond the hegemonic restraints of the dominant legal frameworks 
at play.  
 
1. Applying Transsystemic: Res Extra Commercium, Res Divini 
Juris, and Res Sacrae 
The transsystemic methodology employed for the present 
purposes turns to Roman law and the notion of res extra 
commercium. As Rudolph Sohm writes, within the legal framework 
dealing with “things,” the Roman term “res” refers to anything that 
could comprise part of an individual’s property and “is a material 
object which admits of human dominion and has an independent 
existence as a whole complete in itself.”308 This is then divided into 
different kinds of “things.” One of these categories, res extra 
commercium (reminiscent of Appadurai’s and Kopytoff’s notion of 
“terminal commodities”),309 refers to things that “are prevented by 
a rule of law from being the objects of private rights” and thus are 
“outside of the commercial world” and not subject to the transfer of 
private rights in the object from one individual to another—meaning 
that never within the object’s life can it be legally bought or sold.310 
In addition, the object accorded res extra commercium status 
escapes acquisitive prescription, laches, and statutes of limitation.311  
The types of objects falling into this category are further divided 
into three classes: res divini juris, res publicae, and res omnium 
communes. Of particular relevance for the present discussion is res 
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divini juris, which is in turn divided into res sacrae ("things 
dedicated to the gods, [i.e.,] temples and altars"), res sanctae 
("things enjoying the special protection of the gods, [i.e.,] the walls 
of Rome"), and res religiosae ("things dedicated to the dii Manes”—
the spirits of the deceased—[i.e.,] burial grounds).312 Within this 
context, turning back to potent cultural object and Noble’s 
description of “ownership as belonging” rather than “ownership as 
property,” a potent cultural object would fall under the classification 
of one of the three categories of res divini juris listed above—a thing 
that cannot be subject to private rights, and as a result, cannot be 
subject to the transfer of these rights due to its classification.313  
 
VIII. HINTS OF RES EXTRA COMMERCIUM 
 
A. Res Extra Commercium in the International Context 
Internationally, res extra commercium status is often accorded 
to cultural objects in Europe.314 The res extra commercium status of 
res divini juris identified “things” can be observed in the notions of 
imprescriptibility and inalienability of certain objects that are 
common within the legal frameworks of civil jurisdictions, the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, and very stringently in the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention.315 Referring to a cultural object as inalienable or 
imprescriptible indicates that the object is of such great importance 
that it cannot be transferred. The state that has the imprescriptible or 
inalienable right over the object cannot be alienated from its rights—
no third party, regardless of whether or not they are in good faith, 
can achieve ownership in any way including short- or long-term 
possession.316  
In terms of inalienability provisions, Article 13(d) of the 1970 
UNESCO Convention provides: 
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The States Parties to this Convention also undertake, 
consistent with the laws of each State: 
. . . . 
(d) to recognize the indefeasible right of each State 
Party to this Convention to classify and declare 
certain cultural property as inalienable which should 
therefore ipso facto not be exported, and to facilitate 
recovery of such property by the State concerned in 
cases where it has been exported.317 
 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention addresses this same notion in 
Article 3, and Article 3(4) is the closest the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention comes to a res extra commercium regime; but is, as 
Stamatoudi suggests, “not close enough”318: 
 
[A] claim for restitution of a cultural object forming 
an integral part of an identified monument or 
archaeological site, or belonging to a public 
collection, shall not be subject to time limitations 
other than a period of three years from the time when 
the claimant knew the location of the cultural object 
and the identity of its possessor.319 
 
The removal of time limitations is subject to the caveat in Article 
3(5) that allows for a party to unilaterally impose a seventy-five year 
time limit from when the claimant became aware of the location.320 
In addition, there is limited acknowledgment of the many objects 
that a state may consider as potent and wish to have categorized 
under this protected status.321  
With regard to the provisions that deal with the return of illegally 
exported cultural objects that may fall under protected status, Article 
7(1) specifies that these return provisions will not apply where: 
 
(a) the export of a cultural object is no longer illegal 
at the time at which the return is requested; or 
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(b) the object was exported during the lifetime of the 
person who created it or within a period of fifty years 
following the death of that person.322 
 
But Article 7(2) recognizes the effects of this on indigenous 
source groups by providing a caveat to the exception: 
 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph 
(b) of the preceding paragraph, the provisions of this 
Chapter shall apply where a cultural object was made 
by a member or members of a tribal or indigenous 
community for traditional or ritual use by that 
community and the object will be returned to that 
community.323 
 
Here the terms “traditional” and “ritual” will not necessarily 
encompass all claims, as they maintain the logic of the colonizer and 
do not account for internal group norms and definitions of what 
constitutes an object that should fall under this status. Ultimately, 
the designation of traditional or ritual will be at the discretion of the 
court before which a claim is brought.324 
More importantly, these remain incomplete applications of res 
extra commericum since the element of assigned market value to 
cultural objects remains, and the interests of the good faith purchaser 
is paramount. For example, 1970 UNESCO Convention allows for 
the compensation of purchasers in good faith at Article 7(b)(ii):  
 
[A]t the request of the State Party of origin, to take 
appropriate steps to recover and return any such 
cultural property imported after the entry into force 
of this Convention in both States concerned, 
provided, however, that the requesting State shall 
pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or 
to a person who has valid title to that property. 
Requests for recovery and return shall be made 
through diplomatic offices. The requesting Party 
shall furnish, at its expense, the documentation and 
other evidence necessary to establish its claim for 
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recovery and return. The Parties shall impose no 
customs duties or other charges upon cultural 
property returned pursuant to this Article. All 
expenses incident to the return and delivery of the 
cultural property shall be borne by the requesting 
Party.325 
 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention also suffers from an 
incomplete application of res extra commercium. For example, even 
though it acknowledges the “sacred or communally important 
cultural object” and the importance of “traditional and ritual use,” it 
still applies a time limitation to claims for the return of the object—
although the time limitation is extended for this category of 
objects.326 Additionally, the good faith purchaser remains 
protected.327  
 
B. Res Extra Commercium in Civil Law Jurisdictions 
Turning to civil law jurisdictions, several countries acknowledge 
a res extra commercium regime. The French civil code provides that 
a good faith purchaser may have to return cultural objects purchased 
without receiving compensation if a dispossessed owner acts 
quickly enough in reclaiming the objects in question.328 While 
Greek law allows for a good faith purchaser to become the owner 
after the passage of time subsequent to ordinary acquisition by 
possession,329 a limited application of res extra commercium 
nonetheless appears in Article 21(1) of Law 3028/2202: “Movable 
ancient monuments dating up to 1453 belong to the State in terms 
of ownership and possession, are imprescriptible and extra 
commercium according to Article 966 of the Civil Code.”330 German 
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law also recognizes the concept of res sacrae in relation to objects 
that are used for the purpose of religious worship.331 
 
C. Res Extra Commercium in Common Law Jurisdictions 
An example of the partial application of res extra commercium 
within a common law jurisdiction is New Zealand’s Protected 
Objects Act of 1975.332 This Act deals with the market for Maori 
artifacts within New Zealand and restricts the sale of these objects 
to registered collectors.333 Residents of New Zealand who were 
already in possession of a Maori cultural object, or numerous 
objects, before the commencement of the Act have to register as 
collectors if they wish to acquire more objects.334 Since the Act is 
not retrospective, objects within private collections may remain 
sequestered from claimant communities and it remains possible to 
apply for an export permit for Maori items (although not many are 
granted).335 Nonetheless, the Act generally prevents the sale of 
Maori cultural objects to parties outside of New Zealand and guards 
against price inflation that will often result once cultural objects 
enter the international market.336  
Oliver Metzger notes that numerous jurisdictions within the 
United States implicitly recognize the doctrine of res extra 
commercium in relation to certain objects through choice-of-law 
principles following the guidance of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws337—which, upon application of the lex situs 
doctrine,338 may lead a local court to apply the law of a foreign 
jurisdiction that explicitly recognizes the doctrine of res extra 
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commercium.339 The result is that courts in the United States 
ultimately apply a de facto version of res extra commercium.340 
However, this notion remains virtually unrecognized and invisible 
within United States law.341 Yet, as Metzger suggests, “A de jure 
res extra commercium doctrine would give voice to the common 
appreciation of the idea that cultures are composed, in part, of 
symbolic objects and that such objects should not be subjected to the 
vicissitudes of the marketplace.”342 Additionally, it “would give 
expression to a common understanding that the buying and selling 
of certain objects of cultural property leads to injustice.”343 Metzger 
also suggests that a de jure res extra commercium would result in 
clearer notice to purchasers of cultural objects as well as a greater 
legal recognition of the importance of cultural objects that carry a 
potent status.344  
However, in arguing for a de jure res extra commercium in the 
United States, Metzger reifies European legal frameworks. This is 
problematic because most of the international and European legal 
frameworks only go so far as to assign inalienability to potent 
cultural objects rather than truly removing their potential to exist on 
the marketplace. As noted in previous sections, this is through 
maintenance of a market value even while the object is defined as 
unmerchantable. In addition, most civil law jurisdictions—even 
though they may recognize the doctrine of res extra commercium—
simultaneously place comparatively greater importance on the good 
faith purchaser over the owner.345 As such, it follows that de jure res 
extra commercium may logically carry less potential to protect the 
transfer of a potent cultural object within a civil law jurisdiction than 
it would if applied in a common law jurisdiction—even though 
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common law jurisdictions generally do not recognize res extra 
commercium or the notion of inalienable property.346  
Metzger goes on to note that the closest mechanism for 
protection of potent cultural objects that exists in the United States, 
and which “reveals a consciousness at the federal level of the 
significance that some items of cultural property carry,”347 is 
provided by the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).348 Referring to the legislative 
history of NAGPRA, Metzger suggests that NAGPRA “defers to the 
tribe’s definition of a sacred object” at Section 3001(3)(C), which 
defines a sacred object as “specific ceremonial objects which are 
needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for the 
practice of traditional Native American religions by their present 
day adherents.”349 By defining the objects that fall under the 
category of “cultural items” and referring to the laws of the claiming 
Native American group, NAGPRA essentially renders potent 
cultural objects inalienable “insofar as it returns items to a group of 
people who are forbidden by their own law to alienate the items.”350 
Inalienability, however, does not apply retrospectively and does not 
apply to the transfer of rights in a potent cultural object after it has 
been repatriated (its “subsequent alienability”).351 Additionally, 
NAGPRA’s application is limited to only “Indian tribes and Native 
Hawaiian organizations.”352  
While NAGPRA bears no explicit mention of the 
decommodification of potent cultural objects, Sarah Harding 
addresses the question of whether or not NAGPRA’s definition of 
cultural patrimony as “inalienable” leads to the understanding of 
repatriation itself as a process of decommodification.353 While it 
may be viewed in this manner by some, drawing on Appadurai and 
Kopytoff;354 where the potent object diverged from the path of 
commodification upon production, it has never been 
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commodifiable. Instead, the object has suffered from invalid 
commodification through the imposition of Western and 
Eurocentric frameworks. In this sense, “decommodification” is 
more akin to a “recognition” that these objects do not carry a 
commodified value and must therefore be removed from the market 
context.  
 
D. Res Extra Commercium in Canada 
Turning to the domestic context, in Canada, res extra 
commercium appears most clearly in the Civil Code of Quebec 
(CCQ)—reference to things that are hors du commerce.355 
Federally, however, it is only loosely linked to the possibility for 
some objects to be included on the Export Control List,356 which are 
then subject to export control under the CPEIA.357 But in order for 
an object to be included on this list, it must meet the criteria under 
subsection 4(2) of the CPEIA, which reads: 
 
Subject to subsection (3), the Governor in Council 
may include in the Control List, regardless of their 
places of origin, any objects or classes of objects 
hereinafter described in this subsection, the export of 
which the Governor in Council deems it necessary to 
control in order to preserve the national heritage in 
Canada: 
 
(a) objects of any value that are of archaeological, 
prehistorical, historical, artistic or scientific interest 
and that have been recovered from the soil of 
Canada, the territorial sea of Canada or the inland or 
other internal waters of Canada; 
 
b) objects that were made by, or objects referred to 
in paragraph (d) that relate to, the aboriginal peoples 
of Canada and that have a fair market value in 
Canada of more than five hundred dollars; 
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(c) objects of decorative art, hereinafter described in 
this paragraph that were made in the territory that is 
now Canada and are more than one hundred years 
old: 
 
(i) glassware, ceramics, textiles, woodenware 
and works in base metals that have a fair market 
value in Canada of more than five hundred dollars, 
and 
 
(ii) furniture, sculptured works in wood, works in 
precious metals and other objects of decorative art 
that have a fair market value in Canada of more than 
two thousand dollars; 
 
(d) books, records, documents, photographic 
positives and negatives, sound recordings, and 
collections of any of those objects that have a fair 
market value in Canada of more than five hundred 
dollars; 
 
(e) drawings, engravings, original prints and water-
colours that have a fair market value in Canada of 
more than one thousand dollars; and 
 
(f) any other objects that have a fair market value in 
Canada of more than three thousand dollars.358 
 
What is especially notable in the requirements for inclusion on 
the Export Control List is the pervasive reference to “fair market 
value” and the monetary quantification that is attributed to these 
objects, which is contrary to the res divini juris and res extra 
commercium categorization to which potent cultural objects may be 
assigned. In addition, it is still possible to apply for export permit 
for the objects included on the Export Control List, subject to the 
examination of expert examiners. In determining whether or not to 
provide the permit, pursuant to section 11(1) of the Act, the 
examiners will consider:  
 
(a) whether that object is of outstanding significance 
by reason of its close association with Canadian 
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history or national life, its aesthetic qualities, or its 
value in the study of the arts or sciences; and 
 
(b) whether the object is of such a degree of national 
importance that its loss to Canada would 
significantly diminish the national heritage.359 
 
Even if the export permit is refused, the decision is still 
appealable under section 29 of the CPEIA.360 
 
E. Strict Inalienability versus the Complete Application of Res 
Extra Commercium 
Extending the possibilities provided by inalienability, John 
Moustakas argues for the strict inalienability (versus “mere market 
inalienability”) of cultural objects that qualify as “property for 
grouphood.”361 For the present discussion, “property for 
grouphood” would be similar to the “potent” cultural object as well 
as objects falling under Articles 11 and 12 of UNDRIP.362 
Moustakas is of the view that, through strict inalienability, 
“protecting certain types of cultural property ought to be mandatory, 
transcending the authority of national law to do otherwise.”363  
While Moustakas’ strict inalienability is similar to a complete 
application of res extra commercium, he rejects “market 
inalienability,” or essentially, the decommodification of cultural 
objects. Nonetheless, he agrees that the objects should not be 
commodified: “Conceiving of personhood or grouphood in market 
rhetoric by commodifying objects and attributes so essential to 
personal or group being-treating them as monetizable and alienable 
from the self or the group violates both our deepest understanding 
of what it is to be either human or a community.”364 
Yet his concern lies with the remaining ability for gratuitous 
transfer: “In seeking to prevent the evil of commodification, market-
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361 John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict 
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362 See Welsh, supra note 36; UNDRIP, supra note 2, arts. 11–12. 
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inalienability prohibits only sales, not gifts.”365 He views strict 
inalienability as a better means of protecting cultural objects from 
all potential transfers.366  
In this sense, strict inalienability still maintains the colonizer’s 
gaze and paternalistic element, by prohibiting all transfers of 
cultural objects. Regardless of the ability to block gratuitous 
transfers, the ability to request the return of the object free from 
barriers remains. Under a complete application of res extra 
commercium that removes commodification and the transferability 
of a quantifiable property right in the object, a gratuitous transfer 
would speak to Noble’s description of the more fluid perception of 
“ownership as belonging” versus “ownership as property.”367 This 
is important since gift giving and exchange are not uncommon in the 
history of potent cultural objects for the purposes of strengthening 
relationships of respect and responsibility.368 Additionally, due to 
res extra commercium status, the permanent transfer of property 
rights in such an object would be impossible. Concern lies with the 
rupture in the fluid exchange embodied by gifting and exchange 
where the return of the potent cultural object in question is refused, 
is conditional upon payment, or impeded by other barriers. In that 
sense, strict inalienability both takes the disallowance of transfer too 
far while maintaining the hegemony of Western and Eurocentric 
notions of property law.  
 
1. Determining Potency 
Nonetheless, Moustakas’ model of strict inalienability is helpful 
due to the flexible mechanism he suggests for identifying whether 
or not a cultural object may qualify as “property for grouphood” in 
order to be shielded from transfer by strict inalienability. This is very 
important in addressing one of the fundamental flaws that exists in 
current partial applications of res extra commercium: how to 
determine what objects qualify for protection under an extra 
commercium-type regime. In order to identify whether or not an 
object qualifies as “property for grouphood,” Moustakas proposes a 
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two-pronged test that is fact-sensitive and determined on a case-by-
case basis: 1) the cultural object must be “bound up” with a group’s 
identity;369 and 2) the retention of the object does not constitute “bad 
object relations.”370 This is in contrast to the balance of international 
legislation that refers to res extra commercium with the imposition 
of delineated categories, as we have seen previously, where the 
objects of claimants are potent if the hegemon agrees that they may 
be classified as such. It is not clear, however, the precise role of legal 
pluralism in Moustakas’ property for grouphood test and the weight 
that would be accorded to the group’s own internal norms in 
defining which objects are bound up with their identity.  
In this vein, Canadian courts have been known to refer to 
Aboriginal customary law and internal norms, and371 Quebec courts 
have exhibited a progressive application of legal pluralism in the 
identification of a potent cultural object. For the colonizer’s gaze to 
be removed, the determination of what constitutes a potent object 
should be determined in this manner. 
 
IX. TOWARDS A COMPLETE APPLICATION OF RES EXTRA 
COMMERCIUM 
Res extra commercium provides a way of perceiving potent 
cultural objects in a manner removed from the hegemony of Western 
and Eurocentric frameworks. 
In the international context, individual states ultimately oversee 
the sale and transfer of cultural objects through their domestic laws, 
                                                                                                                                     
369 Moustakas, supra note 361, at 1196–97. Moustakas outlines several 
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their application of private international law, the choice of whether 
or not to ratify or implement the relevant international conventions, 
and their perception of the international trade in cultural objects that 
is contained within the state’s legal framework.372 This leads to 
unpredictability, a lack of uniformity, and often unequitable 
treatment of subaltern and non-dominant claimants when conflicts 
or claims pertaining to cultural objects arise. Kurt Siehr highlights 
the problems of international law in dealing with the international 
commerce of cultural objects that are present due to diverging 
national laws related to property and cultural heritage.373  
As explored above, not only do these national legal frameworks 
create barriers domestically for repatriation claims, but they are 
magnified at the international level once the diverging legal 
frameworks interact in claims for the return of cultural objects by 
source subaltern groups and source states. All of these rules, laws, 
and policies—even where the doctrine of res extra commercium is 
loosely embodied in the classifications of property as inalienable—
still revolve around the market and commodified value of potent 
cultural objects. Even where restrictions on the sale and transfer and 
export and import of cultural objects render these transactions 
illegal, they nonetheless continue to occur. This is possible since 
cultural objects, regardless of legal rules, are still acceptably 
assigned a market value that bears worth to the purchaser or 
acquiring entity outside of the unquantifiable and unmerchantable 
potent value it carries to source claimants.  
International and state removal (or recognition) of the notion 
that such objects may carry a monetary value will eventually lead to 
a drying up of the demand for acquisition of the objects where their 
potent status carries no market worth outside of the potent worth 
carried by the object for source countries and source states. 
A complete application of res extra commercium would make 
potent cultural objects unmerchantable, remove them from the 
marketplace entirely, and remove the legality of transferring 
property rights held in these objects—in addition to shielding them 
from acquisitive prescription, laches, and statutes of limitation.374 
This complete application of res extra commercium could be used 
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to create a unified system for dealing with potent cultural objects 
that would remove many of the barriers to repatriation and return 
that currently exist. This would also avoid implicating the hegemony 
of the dominant Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks that 
remain as colonial relics within which repatriation and return claims 
must currently navigate.  
Similar to Siehr’s reference to the universal recognition of 
stealing as a crime where “the acquisition of title to property by theft 
is forbidden,”375 the same would apply to the forbidden acquisition 
of potent cultural objects classified as res extra commercium. This 
approach would address the divergence that Siehr notes in relation 
to the application of national rules that differ in the treatment of 
acquisition of stolen property by third party purchasers, and the 
application of time limitations, and so on. While theft is generally 
forbidden across jurisdictional divides, the return of the removed 
property is the site where divergence occurs—such as with the 
greater relative importance placed on the good faith purchaser in 
civil law jurisdictions, or the divergence in application of time 
limitations for reclaiming a removed object, and so on. A complete 
application of res extra commercium speaks to this site of 
divergence where the unmerchantable status of the object does not 
permit the transfer of the value of an object to a purchaser—which 
renders a purchase made in good faith irrelevant as it should simply 
be impossible to purchase such objects.  
Time limitations for reclaiming the object would also be 
irrelevant since the initial transfer of the object that prefaces reclaim 
would be impossible. Where purchase does not yield acquisition of 
a valid title, “then there can be no deprivation.”376  
Viewing ownership as belonging instead of as property377 also 
speaks to the irrelevance of the transfer of property rights that 
ultimately underlies conflicts related to repatriation and return 
where the object is invaluable and unmerchantable to one party (the 
source) yet simultaneously carries market value for the purchaser or 
possessor of the object. 
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A. Res Extra Commercium in Quebec, Canada: A Complete 
Application 
Extending Metzger’s argument pertaining to the existence of a 
de facto res extra commercium in the United States to Canada, it 
could similarly be argued that the same exists in Canada where de 
facto res extra commercium is applied by local courts in 
adjudicating conflicts implicating private international law and the 
doctrine of lex situs. Metzger instead suggests that Canada explicitly 
demonstrates a version of the doctrine of res extra commercium. Yet 
the example he refers to, the case of l’Ange-Gardien,378 is not 
atypical of the situation in Canada. First, l’Ange-Gardien arose 
within the Province of Quebec, which is a civil law jurisdiction, and 
thus necessarily dealt with the claim for return through the legal 
framework influenced by the civil law tradition rather than the 
common law framework. Second, while the CCQ and the case of 
l’Ange-Gardien may provide for the res extra commercium status of 
potent cultural objects, other aspects of Quebec’s legal framework, 
such as its Cultural Property Act, do not.379 Much as with Canada’s 
CPEIA, sections 7.12–7.15 of Quebec’s Cultural Property Act refer 
to the “fair market value of a cultural property.”380 
But Metzger has revealed the tip of an iceberg with his reference 
to this isolated application of res extra commercium in Canada. 
Upon further examination, l’Ange-Gardien provides a potential 
model for how res extra commercium could be realistically applied 
across Canada in claims for repatriation and return as well as at an 
international level and within international mechanisms for 
repatriation and return (such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention and 
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention).381 The importance of l’Ange-
Gardien is also elevated through its application of legal pluralism in 
determining whether or not an object is potent in order to benefit 
from res extra commercium (or hors de commerce status in this 
case). This case demonstrates that Quebec law is able to easily apply 
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res extra commercium by reference to the law of the group in 
question in order to determine potency.  
It is also important to note that in this case the res extra 
commercium status of the potent cultural objects trumped the typical 
importance accorded to the third party good faith purchaser and 
good faith possessor.  
 
1. l’Ange-Gardien and Quebec Law 
The current CCQ came into effect on January 1, 1994 and 
replaced the Civil Code of Lower Canada (CCLC), which had been 
in effect since July 1, 1866. The CCLC was still in force at the time 
l’Ange-Gardien was heard by the Superior Court of Quebec and the 
Quebec Court of Appeal. The CCLC implicitly referred to canon 
law in provisions such as Article 2217, which dealt explicitly with 
things deemed sacred.382 While today the CCQ does not have an 
exact equivalent to Article 2217 CCLC and does not refer explicitly 
to sacred objects in the same manner, it maintains the notion by 
reference to the concept of things that are hors de commerce—
essentially a permutation of res extra commercium—in Article 2876 
as well as through the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure Article 553, 
which deems certain things as exempt from seizure.  
As explained above, objects that fall under this category cannot 
be sold, and thus they are exempt from seizure and prescription such 
that property and ownership rights cannot be acquired simply due to 
the passage of time. According to Article 2217, while there are 
certain things that are hors de commerce due to their very nature 
(such as human corpses), other things are deemed hors de commerce 
due to their “destination” (or “purpose,” such as worship).383 But 
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Les choses sacrées, tant que la destination n'en a pas été changée 
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aside from legislation that provides for potent items as well as 
reference to canon law, Quebec courts have also demonstrated how 
the notion of hors de commerce—or res extra commercium—may 
be interpreted and realistically applied through legal pluralistic 
methodology in addressing civil legal matters.  
As far as the internal legal framework of the Roman Catholic 
Church functions, canon law takes precedence followed by State 
law,384 and State law regulates the Church’s system of ownership by 
providing a juridical structure.385 Since 1791, Quebec has integrated 
relevant canon law through legislation such as the current Act 
Respecting Fabriques.386 
The most important points to take away from the case of l’Ange-
Gardien for the present purposes are:  
 
(1) the court’s deference to the internal norms and rules of 
the claimant group in determining the objects claimed were 
sacred (or “potent”);  
 
(2) the resulting application of hors de commerce status (or 
res extra commercium) through a legal pluralistic 
methodology;  
 
(3) the nullification of the transfer of property due to its 
sacred, invaluable, and hors de commerce status, and 
unsanctioned sale pursuant to the internal process, norms, 
and rules of the claimant group; and 
 
(4) that the objects were returned to the claimant without 
indemnity to the possessors in spite of the bona fide nature 
of the sale, the seller, and third party good faith 
purchasers.387 
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Founded in 1664, the parish of l’Ange Gardien in Quebec is one 
of Canada’s oldest.388 The facts of the case begin around 1962 with 
the Roman Catholic Church in the midst of an overhaul of its liturgy 
that sought to move towards greater simplicity.389 This required 
many parish priests, such as the former parish priest of l’Ange-
Gardien, Joseph-Henri Gariépy, to reorganize and downsize the 
Church environment.390 This effort often involved the hasty sale of 
cultural objects at bargain prices—much to the delight of museums 
and collectors—since most parish priests were not aware of the 
artistic, cultural, and patrimonial value embodied by these 
objects.391  
Gariépy sold Roger Prévost, a sculptor-guilder, a series of 
objects that Gariépy believed to be of little value. Evidence 
produced during the superior court hearings showed the purchase 
price to have been 800 Canadian dollars.392 Yet, the market value of 
these objects was far higher than the price for which they were 
sold.393 And in selling these objects, Gariépy never asked for 
permission through the proper channels within the Catholic Church, 
although the checks for the purchase of the objects were made 
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payable to the parish’s Church Council and were deposited in the 
Church Council’s bank account.394  
Through a series of subsequent sales, the objects eventually 
came to be housed in the National Gallery of Canada and the Musée 
du Quebec, as well as with private collectors. Gariépy left the parish 
in 1973 and his successor, Marc Leclerc, began to question the sale 
of the objects until he was finally able to trace them to their current 
possessors.395 Upon locating them, he referred to the CCLC’s 
treatment of sacred objects as imprescriptible and hors de commerce 
in order to argue that the objects remained protected under this 
category of things since their sacred “destination” remained. He 
argued that their destination remained the same because they had not 
been desacralized according to canon law. Additionally, Leclerc 
noted that the objects had been alienated without the written 
authorization that must be obtained from the archbishop of the 
diocese and that the sale of these objects was thus illegal pursuant 
to Quebec civil law.396 
Following this line of argumentation, in 1976 the Church 
Council of the parish filed a lawsuit against Prévost and the other 
parties in possession of the objects. The lawsuit sought the return of 
the objects and the nullification of the original transaction.397 The 
defendants, however, argued that the provisions of the CCLC could 
not be relied on in asserting canon law since the CCLC did not 
expressly refer to it. According to the defendants, this meant that 
transaction remained valid because, without reference to canon law, 
it was irrelevant that Gariépy had not received written permission to 
sell the objects and that he had both the right to transfer the objects 
as well as the power to change the destination of the objects, which 
they argued were thus desacralized upon sale.398  
In a 136-page judgment, Justice Bernier of the Quebec Superior 
Court agreed with the arguments of the claimant and recognized the 
application of canon law in relation to the identification of a sacred 
object as well as the process to be followed in order to desacralize 
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and validly alienate the objects in question.399 Following this 
analysis, Justice Bernier ultimately found the objects in question to 
be hors de commerce according to canon law and thus, also 
according to Quebec law. He also found that the defendants had not 
met their burden of demonstrating that the objects had been 
desacralized.400 This resulted in the nullification of the initial 
contract of sale without indemnification to the defendants.401  
Interestingly, Justice Bernier asserted that the defendants should 
have known that the purchased objects came from a parish or a 
religious community, that the objects were sacred pursuant to 
Article 2217 CCLC, and that they did not discharge their burden of 
insuring that the objects had been appropriately desacralized.402 He 
went on to suggest that the defendants should have done this if they 
wished to avoid the enforcement of “public order” mandating the 
unindemnified return of the objects to the claimant.403  
The decision of the superior court was upheld in the Quebec 
Court of Appeal.404 Agreeing with Justice Maloof’s opinion in 
support of the first instance judge’s ruling, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
wrote that the relevant portions of the CCLC should be construed in 
accordance with the internal rules, norms, and codes of the particular 
group in question. She specifically referred to sectarian groups and 
their codes, such as Catholic canon law, the Torah for Judaism, and 
the Koran for those of Muslim faith.405 But Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
also noted that these codes were not explicitly incorporated into 
Quebec law and that it instead referred to the authority and 
sovereignty of the group in question to determine their beliefs.406  
Some of the defendants, notably the National Museums of 
Canada and Prévost (the original purchaser), appealed the decision 
to the Supreme Court of Canada, but leave to appeal was denied on 
17 December 1987.407 With this definitive confirmation of the 
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decisions of the Quebec Superior Court and the Quebec Court of 
Appeal, the potent cultural objects of l’Ange-Gardien were finally 
returned home to the parish’s Church Council. 
 
X. WHO DECIDES WHAT IS POTENT: LEGAL PLURALISM AS 
METHODOLOGY 
l’Ange-Gardien demonstrates an important element in applying 
res extra commercium: how the potency of an object may be 
determined. Even if Moustakas’ two-pronged test is applied, 
whether or not the object is “bound up” with a group’s identity 
would require a subjective case-by-case assessment determined 
through reference to a group’s internal cultural and customary 
rules.408 As a result, legal pluralism is needed in order to fully apply 
res extra commercium in a manner appropriate to dealing with the 
claimant group in question. 
While legal pluralism bears the brunt of numerous critiques that 
warn against viewing its use as a panacea,409 the particular 
application of legal pluralism used in l'Ange-Gardien is important 
because it defers to the claimant group's cultural or customary 
internal rules of what constitutes a potent object in determining an 
object's res sacrae status. Legal pluralism, used in this context, 
would create international consistency towards deference to the 
claimant group’s notions of the potent object in their claims for the 
return of such objects. Applying legal pluralism in this manner thus 
leads to the ability for greater incorporation of res extra 
commercium, which would effectively enforce the invaluable nature 
of potent cultural objects, remove them from the market, and 
eliminate the colonizer’s gaze that remains embodied by the current 
hegemony of legal frameworks available for repatriation and return. 
In order to recreate this outcome, international courts and other 
states need to incorporate this level of deference. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
408 Moustakas, supra note 361, at 1196–1201.  
409 See generally LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND 
PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE (Brian Tamahana, Caroline Sage & Michael 
Woolcock, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
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A. Acceptable Evidence and Legal Pluralism 
R v. Heller—the case involving the attempt by the government 
of Nigeria to recover a Nok artifact that had been illegally exported 
from Nigeria and imported into Canada410—exhibits the reality of 
having international mechanisms that address claims for return. 
Local courts are often hindered by domestic law in applying 
international conventions as these may only have come into effect 
on the date upon which they were incorporated into the domestic 
legal framework. R v. Heller also demonstrates the role played by 
the acceptability of various forms of evidence in domestic courts. 
Difficulties with acceptable evidence exist on a number of fronts, 
including the need to prove the provenance of the object, the potency 
of the object, and the object’s potency to the claimant group.  
Even when an equitable resolution should clearly result in the 
return of potent cultural objects, rigid domestic and international 
legal frameworks insist on evidence that meets the standards of the 
forum within which claims are heard. And most of the time these 
standards are based on conventional Western and Eurocentric 
conceptions of ownership, title, property, time, purchase, market 
value, and commodification. As demonstrated in l’Ange-Gardien, 
the application of legal pluralism and reference to the evidence that 
would be required according to the claimant group’s own internal 
rules would provide the opportunity for a more equitable resolution 
that begins to step away from the hegemony of Western and 
Eurocentric legal frameworks.411  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
410 R v. Heller (1983), 27 Alta. L.R. 2d 346 (Can. Alta.). See supra Part V.C.1. 
411 In addition, in the Canadian application of legal pluralism to evidentiary rules 
in Aboriginal title claims provides guidance for “adapt[ing] the laws of evidence 
so that the aboriginal perspective on their practices, customs and traditions and 
on their relationship with the land, are given due weight by the courts. 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997], 3 S.C.R. 1010. In practical terms, this 
requires the courts to come to terms with the oral histories of aboriginal 
societies, which, for many aboriginal nations, are the only record of their past.” 
Id. at para. 84; see generally id. at paras. 84–107. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
A. The Realities of Implementation and Enforcement 
While enforcing the cooperation of destination, or “market,” 
states would likely pose a challenge,412 the model outlined by this 
Article challenges the ever-present colonizer’s mentality that exists 
within destination states. The goal is removing the colonial gaze and 
it takes time to alter pervasive worldviews. But where an object no 
longer has value and purchasers are expected to know that certain 
objects are susceptible to res extra commercium status—as was 
stated of the third-party purchasers in l’Ange-Gardien—this 
knowledge and responsibility will ideally become part of the 
cultural fabric of destination states. 
A brief analogy to the trafficking of illegal substances can be 
drawn. When they are bought and traded, the parties to the 
transaction are aware that the product could be stripped from them 
without compensation because it is not a legally merchantable 
product. It is not possible to purchase an illegal substance in good 
faith or by accident. In the vein of Justice Bernier’s decision in 
l’Ange-Gardien, the excuse of the innocent third party purchaser 
would no longer be a shield as it would become accepted that the 
purchaser “really should have known better” and should have done 
their due diligence in researching the provenance and potency of the 
object in question in order to meet their onus.  
Justice Bernier’s discussion of this matter is in direct contrast to 
Judge Gray’s uncomfortable decision in Peru v. Johnson regarding 
the return of Pre-Columbian cultural objects to Peru.413 Judge Gray 
referenced the uncomfortable reality of the legal framework 
blocking Peru from its claims for the return of the objects. The 
difficulties encountered notably intersect with the market value that 
these objects have been attributed—their sale and the value behind 
ownership—and the notion of a purchase made in good faith. Even 
though Judge Gray noted the priceless nature of the objects in 
question and that the courts of the United States should have been 
supportive of Peru in its endeavours to remedy and end the 
                                                                                                                                     
412 Bell & Paterson, International Movement, supra note 53, at 99. 
413 Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal 1989), aff’d mem. Peru v. 
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destruction of its cultural heritage, the good faith element of the 
purchase trumps the priceless importance of these objects to their 
source. 
 
Irrespective of the decision in this matter, the court 
has considerable sympathy for Peru with respect to 
the problems that it confronts as manifested by this 
litigation. It is evident that many priceless and 
beautiful Pre-Columbian artifacts excavated from 
historical monuments in that country have been and 
are being smuggled abroad and sold to museums and 
other collectors of art. Such conduct is destructive of 
a major segment of the cultural heritage of Peru, and 
the plaintiff is entitled to the support of the courts of 
the United States in its determination to prevent 
further looting of its patrimony. 
However, there is substantial evidence that Mr. 
Johnson purchased the subject items in good faith 
over the years, and the plaintiff must overcome legal 
and factual burdens that are heavy indeed before the 
court can justly order the subject items to be removed 
from the defendant's possession and turned over to 
the plaintiff.414 
 
In Canada, if the res extra commercium status of an object were 
to trump a bona fide purchase and lead to its removal from the hands 
of the purchaser, this might be reminiscent of forfeiture cases 
dealing with foreign cultural objects smuggled into Canada. At the 
border, the smuggler often misidentifies the value and place of 
origin of the smuggled cultural objects, which leads to forfeiture 
under Section 122 of Canada’s Customs Act.415 The forfeited 
objects then become property of the Crown and are usually sent back 
to the object’s country of origination.416 
Economically, the potential res extra commercium status of 
cultural objects creates a risk that motivates potential buyers to meet 
a self-imposed higher onus in acquiring cultural objects. Cultural 
objects would become risky investments without thorough research 
                                                                                                                                     
414 Id. at 811–12 (emphasis added). 
415 Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985,  c. 1 (Can.) (2d Supp). See also Bell & Paterson, 
International Movement, supra note 53, at 90. 
416 Customs Act, R.S.C. s. 142(1)(a). See also Bell & Paterson, International 
Movement, supra note 53, at 90. 
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and the barriers in acquiring the objects (rather than in the return of 
the objects) may lessen demand.  
Certainly the argument exists that disallowing the sale of potent 
cultural objects would create a black market for their sale and even 
inflate their value417—but this is largely a red herring. Removing the 
commodification of these objects and the ability for them to be 
assigned a market value would work to remove the colonial Western 
and Eurocentric barriers that currently exist in frameworks for 
repatriation and return. Once objects were located, the process to 
have them returned—skewed towards Western and Eurocentric 
notions—would at least remove the necessity of purchasing an 
object that is not commodifiable. The intent would be to create a 
long-term change in the mentality of those interested in cultural 
artifacts: that potent cultural objects cannot be bought and sold as 
they do not travel within Western and Eurocentric notions of 
commodification.  
 
B. Remaining Work to be Done 
Of course it bears noting that removing the commodification of 
cultural objects is no panacea in dealing with the exact group, 
location, state, and so on, that an object should be returned to. 
Internationally, even when cultural objects are returned to a source 
country, this does not necessarily address the concerns of subaltern 
groups within the borders of the states or groups that span the 
borders of neighbouring states.418 Domestically, the return of objects 
to particular indigenous groups within a state will again not 
necessarily account for subaltern groups that may be marginalized 
within the indigenous group in question—whether due to gender 
identity, social hierarchies, or economic prowess. However, the 
focus of applying res extra commercium through legal pluralistic 
methodology is to identify and deconstruct the overarching barriers 
that are faced in claims for repatriation and return and the colonial 
gaze that is maintained by viewing and dealing with potent cultural 
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objects through Western and Eurocentric legal frameworks and 
notions of commodification.  
Whenever a new system is instituted, manners of treating the 
retrospective application must be addressed and those who may find 
themselves suddenly dispossessed of the market value of an object 
purchased would not be entirely pleased with the situation. These 
challenges, while they are beyond the scope of the Article, 
demonstrate that much work will need to be done to truly and 
completely remove the colonizer’s gaze. The intent here stems from 
a critical analysis to suggest a mechanism that might change 
perceptions. An analysis that might raise awareness as to the deeply 
problematic legal and extralegal frameworks that characterize the 
current options available for claims of repatriation and return by 
subaltern groups and countries as the scourges of colonialism are 
gradually removed. This Article’s intention has been to explore what 
a departure from the status quo might look like if the attempt were 
made to remove all relics of colonialism exemplified by the 
hegemony of Western and Eurocentric values, frameworks, and 
commodification.  
